FROM PARALYSIS IN RWANDA TO BOLD MOVES IN LIBYA:
EMERGENCE OF THE “RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT” NORM
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW --
IS THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY READY FOR IT?

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I. INTRODUCTION

The international community lacked neither the resources nor the capacity to
prevent genocide in Rwanda and subsequently to stop it as approximately 800,000 men,
women, and children were brutally slaughtered by fellow Rwandans in about 100 days
from April through July 1994. What happened can only be attributed to “a persistent lack
of political will by Member States to act, or to act with enough assertiveness” which
affected the decision-making and response by the United Nations Security Council and
Secretariat.¹

In its December 1999 report, a UN commission established by then Secretary-
General Kofi Annan to conduct an independent inquiry into the UN’s actions during the
Rwandan genocide found “a failure by the United Nations system as a whole.”² On
receiving the Commission’s report Kofi Annan said that what happened in Rwanda was
indeed “genocide in its purest and most evil form.”³ A similar high-level commission
comprising “Eminent Personalities” that was established by African Heads of States and
Governments stated in its report: “Almost the entire world stood by and watched the
genocide happen. Influential outsiders worked closely with the perpetrators. The victims
were betrayed repeatedly by the international community, often for the most craven of reasons. 

This essay discusses the soul-searching by the international community in the ensuing years and the lessons of the Rwanda tragedy, which eventually led to a greater willingness to accept the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) norm as an operating principle. Part II briefly provides a context for the genocide in Rwanda and recounts the tragic events. It also documents the lack of effective action by the United Nations which led to the tragedy. Part III highlights the evolution of the Responsibility to Protect concept from its early stages. Part IV discusses its invocation by the Security Council in Libya and, pursuant to the Council’s action, NATO’s use of force to protect citizens in Libya. Part V concludes with appraisal and recommendations.

II. THE GENOCIDE IN RWANDA AND THE LACK OF EFFECTIVE ACTION BY THE UNITED NATIONS

The initial inaction by the world community to prevent and subsequently to halt the genocide was examined by numerous studies and reports in the aftermath of the genocide. Two reports are especially important, one by a commission established by the United Nations and the other by the Organization of African Unity (OAU). To fully understand and appreciate the tragic events of 1994, the context is essential and hence included here is a brief look at the preceding events, especially those following 1990.

A. Events Leading Up to the Genocide

The OAU study traces the roots of the crisis to 1959 and details the history from 1959 on to the genocide. It reports that from October 1, 1990, Rwanda endured three and a half years of violent anti-Tutsi incidents, each of which in retrospect can easily be interpreted as a deliberate step
in a vast conspiracy culminating in the shooting down of the President’s plane on April 6, 1994, and the subsequent unleashing of the genocide.\(^9\)

The media played a very influential role in inflaming the hatred. Along with newspapers, Radio-Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLMC) was instrumental in inciting the Hutu majority against the Tutsi minority, and the official Radio Rwanda also “moved steadily from neutral reporting to open brainwashing.”\(^{10}\) The OAU report describes vividly the planning for the genocide:

> Beginning with the response to the 1990 RPF [the Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front] invasion, the violence had been government-initiated and provoked . . . . By the time it was finally unleashed, the violence was deliberate, planned, organized, sophisticated, and coordinated. It was motivated by that which distinguishes genocide from crimes against humanity or mass murder: A clique of Rwandan Hutu consciously intended to exterminate all Tutsi in the country, specifically including women and children so that no future generations would ever appear. If the rest of the world could not contemplate the possibility that they would go that far, it was certainly known that they were prepared to go to a great distance indeed.\(^{11}\)

The RPF invasion, which began on October 1, 1990, had a history behind it.\(^12\) As the Hutu took over the government in Rwanda in the early 1960s, Tutsis became victims of pogroms. Hundreds of thousands of Rwandans fled and became refugees in neighboring countries, including Uganda. The RPF members were mostly children of Tutsi refugees in Uganda who were not permitted by the Rwandan government to return and had suffered hardships in Uganda. They had joined Ugandan rebel leader Yoweri Museveni’s National Resistance Army and, after he came to power, they were serving in his army and were mostly well trained and well armed.

> With the 1990 invasion, Rwanda plunged into civil war that lasted until July when the RPF defeated the government forces and took control of Rwanda. A series of negotiations and ceasefires took place during the next three years. As the Rwandan
government was heavily dependent on foreign financial assistance for its functioning, under donors’ pressures President General Juvénal Habyarimana agreed to negotiate with the RPF for a peaceful resolution of the conflict. However, several Tutsi massacres took place after the invasion, which were precursors of the 1994 genocide.\textsuperscript{13} In its report of March 1993, the International Commission of Inquiry into Human Rights Abuse in Rwanda, established jointly by four international human rights organizations, including Human Rights Watch, stated that “President Habyarimana and his immediate entourage bear heavy responsibility for these massacres and other abuses against Tutsi and members of the political opposition.”\textsuperscript{14}

The mounting concern with the deteriorating situation in Rwanda led the OAU to take initiative to resolve the conflict. Several western states, including the US and France, as well as the United Nations, also took an active part in the process. The President of Tanzania facilitated the process and the outcome was the Arusha Peace Agreement on August 4, 1993.\textsuperscript{15} Major provisions of the Arusha Accords included power-sharing by the Habyarimana with the RPF and integration of the two armies. The United Nations and the OAU were involved in the implementation of the accords through the establishment of the Neutral International Force (NIF) with the United Nations and the OAU constituting that force. On September 10, the UN Security Council issued a statement by the president\textsuperscript{16} on the establishment of a peacekeeping operation in Rwanda, and two weeks later the Secretary General presented a report to the Security Council setting out a plan for deploying a peacekeeper force of 2,548 military personnel.\textsuperscript{17} The Council subsequently established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) on October 5.\textsuperscript{18}
Also in October, however, a newly-elected Hutu president in Burundi was assassinated by the Tutsi-dominated army, and a large number of Hutu were massacred or fled across the border into Rwanda. As the OAU report states, these events offered final proof to the Hutu that power sharing between the Tutsi and the Hutu was forever doomed. The Tutsi could never be trusted. Hutu extremists saw only one sure way to guarantee that Rwanda’s Tutsi could not carry out their historic aspiration to rule the country unilaterally and to wipe out as many Hutu as was necessary to accomplish this objective. The Hutu must act first. The final solution planned for the Tutsi was thereby justified as nothing more than self-defense on the part of the intended Hutu victims.19

A January 1994 report on Rwanda by Human Rights Watch Arms Project voiced a clear warning:

The recent wave of violence in neighboring Burundi, which has left 10,000-50,000 dead and which also pits Tutsi against Hutu, does not bode well for Rwanda. Indeed, many observers believe that there is little chance that the peace accord, which calls for integration of the two armies, will be implemented. The killings in Burundi have again inflamed the hatred and mistrust of Tutsi and Hutu in Rwanda. The possibility of renewed fighting is very real.20

The warning signs from November 1993 to April 6, 1994, when the political killings began in earnest, were ominous.21 These included political deadlock, killings by the Hutu militia Inderahamwe, reports by General Romeo A. Dallaire who was leading UNAMIR, and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Rwanda, Jacques-Roger Booh Booh, to the Secretary-General about the deterioration in the security situation. On January 11, 1994, Dallaire sent a cable to the military adviser to the UN Secretary-General about an informant, a top-level trainer in the Inderahamwe militia, who had provided him three important pieces of information, to wit: 1) a strategy was in place to provoke the killing of Belgian solders and eventually the withdrawal of UNAMIR’s Belgian battalion from Rwanda; 2) the Inderahamwe had trained 700 men and he had been ordered to register all Tutsi in Kigali, which he suspected was for their
extermination, and that his personnel were able to kill up to 1,000 in 20 minutes, and 3) there was a secret weapons cache whose location he was prepared to show UNAMIR provided his family was given protection. Dallaire informed the Secretariat of UNAMIR’s intention to take action within the next 36 hours. He also sought protection for the informant and his evacuation.

The response to Dallaire was that his contemplated action went beyond the UNAMIR mandate, and he was not to take any action until he received clear guidance from UN Headquarters. In another message from Headquarters, Booh Booh and Dallaire were instructed to meet with the Rwandan president to apprise him of the information, which they did. Repeated requests from Dallaire and Booh Booh for a stronger mandate for UNAMIR went either unanswered or met with a reminder that UNAMIR’s mandate was rather limited and the rules of engagement were “not to fire until fired upon.”

Similar other information from Dallaire regarding weapons distribution by armed militias, death squad target lists, and specific plots to kill political leaders also went unheeded. In his communication to President Habyarimana, the Secretary-General threatened to withdraw UNAMIR unless the Arusha accords were implemented, as the UN’s focus during all this period was primarily on the implementation of the Arusha accords and on advancing the political process. The dogged pursuit of this goal at the UN, championed by the US, led to inaction in effectively responding to the warning signs and thus preventing the genocide.

In a statement to the media on the release of their report on July 7, 2000, members of the International Panel of Eminent Personalities highlighted one of their major findings:
The United States had the influence within the UN Security council to ensure the authorization of a military mission that could have prevented the genocide before it was launched. Even once the genocide began, a serious military mission could dramatically have reduced the magnitude of the slaughter. But the US made sure that no such force would ever reach Rwanda, even after it was known that one of the 20th Century’s greatest tragedies was unfolding.26

B. The Tragic Events Between April 6 and July 18, 1994

Barely twelve hours after the President’s plane was shot down on April 6, the massacres began, initially of targeted political leaders, Tutsi and moderate Hutu, and subsequently killings of the civilian population, primarily Tutsi. Roadblocks were set up to identify Tutsi for elimination and to prevent UNAMIR from coming to their aid. The initial killings were a deliberate policy to eliminate those likely to criticize the genocide or the takeover of the government by extremists. Ten Belgian peacekeepers were provoked by Rwandan soldiers and brutally killed outside the Prime Minister’s residence, which soon led to Belgium’s withdrawal of its peacekeeping force, just as the informant had warned Dallaire. Subsequently Dallaire stated in his submission to the Belgian state inquiry that there was no military option to intervene. In his words: “The UNAMIR mission was a peacekeeping mission. It was not equipped, trained or staffed to conduct intervention operations.”27

The Presidential Guard, the army, national police, and militias, were all actively involved in committing the massacres. After killing Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana, as well as the Vice President, the Foreign Minister, the Minister of Labor and Social Affairs, the Chief Justice, and several other political leaders who were not in favor of the massacres, the killers moved on to eliminate Tutsi civilians.
The UN Security Council warned the interim government of Rwanda on April 30 that an arms embargo might be imposed, as “the killings of civilians had ‘especially’ taken place in areas under the control of [their] members or supporters.” This led the interim government, primarily under the control of Hutu extremists, to again change strategy as it ordered the militias and the “civilian self-defence forces” to track down the remaining Tutsis “and kill them in a more discreet and disciplined fashion” leaving no survivors to tell the story.

In the first five days of the genocide, 20,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu were killed, after which the attacks were focused on killing only Tutsi. Large-scale massacres had begun as thousands sought sanctuary in public places such as schools, offices, hospitals, and churches, and others were ordered by Hutu administrators to gather in large public areas. Many thousands of Tutsi were killed every day for the remaining three weeks of April. The killing finally ended on July 18 when the RPF declared a unilateral ceasefire after gaining control over the country.

Accounts of the hundred days of the tragic events, which are chilling indeed, show some discernible characteristics of the genocide:

1) efficiency in carrying out the planned extermination of the Tutsi;
2) extreme brutality in the methods used; and
3) sophisticated use of the media and control of the message, both internally and externally.

As mentioned earlier, the Tutsi extermination was meticulously planned. As to the execution, the OAU Commission report states:

For decades, Rwanda had been renowned for its efficiency, its administrative competence, its highly-structured system of public administration,
its top-down authority system, and its genius for imposing discipline and deference on its population. All of these attributes were brought to bear in organizing the genocide by calculating elite who understood only too well how to operate this awesomely efficient machine.33

Prime Minister Jean Kambande, who led the Rwandan government during the genocide and was later indicted and tried by the Rwanda War Crimes Tribunal, confessed that during the months of April to July

there was in Rwanda in 1994 a widespread and systematic attack against the civilian population of Tutsi, the purpose of which was to exterminate them. Mass killings of hundreds of thousands occurred in Rwanda, including women and children, old and young, who were pursued and killed at places where they sought refuge: prefectures, commune offices, schools, churches, and stadiums.34

The brutality was unprecedented. The OAU Commission report presents a grim picture, citing Physicians for Human Rights, which identified the following means of killing: “machetes, massues (clubs studded with nails), small axes, knives, grenades, guns, and fragmentation grenades.”35 The report adds: “The genocidaires beat people to death, amputated limbs, buried victims alive, drowned, or raped and killed later. Many victims had both their Achilles tendons cut with machetes in order to immobilize them so they could be finished off at another time.”36 The report continues:

Victims were treated with sadistic cruelty and suffered unimaginable agony. Tutsi were buried alive in graves they had dug themselves. Pregnant women had their wombs slashed open, so the foetuses could be killed. Internal organs were removed from living people. Family members were ordered to kill others in the family or be killed themselves. People were thrown alive into pit latrines. Those who hid in the attic had the house burned down around them. Children were forced to watch the hideous murders of their parents. Lucky victims were those who could bribe their killers to use a bullet for a quick death.37

After the 1990 RPF attack, Tutsi were portrayed as the “enemy” by several newspapers and in radio broadcasts.38 Lies, exaggeration, and ridicule were used to
attack and inflame. People were mobilized through fear, giving the message that Tutsi were planning to take over the country and massacre Hutu. Events were “created” and accusations were made imputing to Tutsi what they were planning to do, for example, terrorism. Propagandists effectively used the media to create intense hatred among Hutu, inciting them to do the killing.

Simultaneously, the message to the outside world was that the interim government, national police, and militias were securing law and order. Strategies were changed so that the outside world was placated.

III. INACTION BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

A. The United Nations

The UN Security Council and Secretariat took no effective action to prevent the genocide in the period leading to April 6, when the Presidential plane was shot down. The UNAMIR had been established with its limited mandate\(^\text{39}\) and a draft set of rules of engagement.\(^\text{40}\) The implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement was the main concern at the UN and the Secretary-General and the Security Council sent repeated messages to the parties urging them to agree to and maintain a ceasefire and to implement the accords. General Dallaire and Booh Booh continued pursuing those goals in their communications with President Habyarimana. The political stalemate and lack of progress in the implementation of the process forced the Secretary-General to threaten withdrawal of UNAMIR unless progress was achieved.\(^\text{41}\) On April 5, 1994, the Security Council decided to extend UNAMIR’s mandate by nearly four months.\(^\text{42}\)

April was marked by the equally ineffective responses of the Security Council and Secretariat in preventing the genocide. UNAMIR lacked adequate resources and a strong
mandate to protect politicians in Kigali, not to mention civilians. The withdrawal of
Belgian peacekeepers dealt a grave blow to UNAMIR’s capacity to protect civilians. In
some instances the peacekeepers abandoned the civilians who had been gathered in
public places to be massacred by waiting militias. Belgium, France, Italy, and the United
States evacuated their expatriates. As Dallaire informed the Headquarters of the arrival
of French aircraft to evacuate the French nationals, a cable from Kofi Annan and signed
by Iqbal Riza asked Dallaire to

cooperate with both the French and Belgian commanders to facilitate the evacuation of their nationals, and other foreign nationals requesting evacuation. . .
. You should make every effort not to compromise your impartiality or to act beyond your mandate but may exercise your discretion to do should this be essential for the evacuation of foreign nationals. This should not, repeat not, extend to participating in possible combat, except in self-defence.43

What an irony that more than a week into the genocide the President of the
Security Council made a Presidential statement without mentioning the ongoing
massacres, as he said that the “immediate priority in Rwanda is the establishment of a ceasefire between the Government forces and the RPF,” and the Council action was to reaffirm the Arusha accords and to call upon the parties to return to the negotiating table and agree to an immediate ceasefire.44

After the genocide began in April the deliberations in the Security Council were focused on whether there should be a total withdrawal of UNAMIR, a position the Belgians preferred, or to keep a small force as a minimum presence. The OAU preferred a stronger mandate and a larger presence of UNAMIR, but there was no political will for that position, and on April 21 the Council voted unanimously to reduce UNAMIR to about 270, while it further curtailed the mission’s mandate.45
It was not until the end of April, when hundreds of thousands of Tutsi had been slaughtered, that the Security Council issued a Presidential statement, in which it referred to the imposition of an arms embargo, but amazingly it still did not agree on using the term “genocide.” On May 6, Booh Booh sent a cable outlining the ongoing massacres of innocent civilians, in which he stated the priorities for UNAMIR: first to have the capacity to stop the killings, and second to continue efforts to reach a ceasefire.

Consultations between the Secretary-General and the Security Council continued, and following his formal report of May 13 the Council decided on May 17 to expand UNAMIR to a maximum of 5,500 military personnel and their phased deployment, creating and mandating UNAMIR II as a Chapter VI peacekeeping operation for humanitarian purposes. It also imposed an arms embargo on Rwanda. However, more than two months after that resolution was adopted, UNAMIR still only had 550 troops, which clearly showed the lack of political will to stop the genocide.

The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, José Ayala Lasso, visited Rwanda on May 11-12, 1994, and gave his report to the Commission on Human Rights a week later. He proposed the appointment of a Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Rwanda, and the Commission accepted the recommendation appointing René Degni-Ségui. The UN Human Rights Commission also convened an emergency session on Rwanda on May 25, 1994, which I attended as an observer for World Federation of United Nations Associations, of which I was then Vice-Chair of the Board. The final resolution of the Commission did not acknowledge that genocide had occurred, although
it did name a special rapporteur to investigate whether genocide had actually taken place.\textsuperscript{52}

It was on May 31, almost eight weeks after the genocide was unleashed, that the Secretary-General finally called the massacres and killings “systematic,” using the word “genocide” in his report to the Security Council.\textsuperscript{53} Eight days later, on June 8, the Security Council endorsed the Secretary-General’s proposals in its reports on the deployment of UNAMIR and extended its mandate until December 9, 1994.\textsuperscript{54} The issues of money, transportation, and logistics were, however, the roadblocks in ensuring the effective functioning of UNAMIR II. In June, France sent forces to Rwanda as “Opération Turquoise,” purportedly for humanitarian purposes.\textsuperscript{55}

More than five years later, the Secretary-General expressed his “deep remorse” and on behalf of the United Nations acknowledged the failure because UNAMIR “was neither mandated nor equipped for the kind of forceful action which would have been needed to prevent or halt the genocide.” In his words, “[a]ll of us must bitterly regret that we did not do more to prevent it.”\textsuperscript{56}

B. The Roles of the OAU, Belgium, France, and the United States

Although the OAU, just as the UN, did not use the term “genocide” throughout the period April to July 1994, it continued to call for a broader mandate for UNAMIR and more effective UN involvement in Rwanda. However, it was reluctant to take sides in the conflict. It opposed Opération Turquoise because of the French support of the interim government, but despite the OAU’s opposition the UN Security Council endorsed the mission and the French forces stayed in the country for several months. After the
RPF victory the OAU established the Eminent Personalities Panel to understand the causes that had triggered the conflict.

The analysis of Belgian policy must begin with the observation that the largest single western contingent of peacekeeping troops after the formation of UNAMIR in October 1993 was from Belgium. Belgium also sought a broadened mandate for UNAMIR, but after the murder of its ten soldiers it withdrew its forces. It then also sought the withdrawal of all UNAMIR troops and tried to persuade Security Council members that UNAMIR must be ended. But on April 6, 2000, during a ceremony in Kigali in commemoration of the sixth anniversary of the genocide, Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt apologized as he assumed Belgium’s “responsibility for what had transpired,” and asked forgiveness on behalf of Belgium and the Belgian people.

The French initially showed no willingness to take any action to halt the genocide. Along with the Belgians, France evacuated its nationals but then in mid-June the government announced plans to send troops to Rwanda for “humanitarian reasons” through “Opération Turquoise.” Contrasting the “sudden availability” of thousands of troops for Opération Turquoise with the UN’s inability to find troops for its peacekeeping operations, the Independent Inquiry reflected on “the varying levels of political will to commit personnel in Rwanda,” and observed: “The Inquiry finds it unfortunate that the resources committed by France and other countries to Opération Turquoise could not instead have been put at the disposal of UNAMIR II.” As mentioned earlier, the French support of the interim government was well known and hence there was criticism, especially by the Organization of African Unity, of the French government’s sending forces to Rwanda. In the course of their mission, the French forces reportedly saved
some 10-15,000 Tutsi, but they also “facilitated the escape of much of the Hutu Power leadership into Zaire.”

As mentioned earlier, the United States swiftly evacuated its nationals and supported the call for UNAMIR’s withdrawal after Belgium troops departed Rwanda. As David Scheffer, who was then a senior adviser and counsel to US Permanent Representative to the UN, Ambassador Madeleine K. Albright, states:

There were enough voices within the US government arguing that UNAMIR was inadequately mandated, trained, equipped, and staffed to respond effectively to the violence in Rwanda, that UN peacekeeping operations worldwide were already overloaded, and that UNAMIR could not satisfy new U.S. government criteria to guide UN peacekeeping deployments. The next step, key officials decided, was to support UNAMIR’s withdrawal and thus accomplish what they had assumed was the UN Secretariat’s genuine objective.

The US, however, did vote to maintain a reduced UNAMIR presence of about 270 personnel. A new US peacekeeping policy, known as the Presidential Decision Directive on Multilateral Peacekeeping Operations (PDD-25), deeply influenced the country’s decision-making on UNAMIR. The October 1993 events in Somalia, where US peacekeepers were murdered and dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, certainly had influenced the new US policy. It was, in Scheffer’s words, “conservative interpretations of the document [which] had the perverse effect of straitjacketing policy-makers, leading them to deny justifiable interventions or prevention when hundreds of thousands of innocent lives were at stake.”

Not only did the US resist swift and decisive action, although it had knowledge that genocide was occurring, it would not permit the use of the term “genocide” by its representatives at the Security Council. However, when President Clinton visited
Rwanda in March 1998, he acknowledged that “a policy aimed at the systematic destruction of a people” was responsible for the Rwandan tragedy, and added

The international community, together with nations in Africa, must bear its share of responsibilities for this tragedy, as well. We did not act quickly enough after the killing began. We should not have allowed the refugee camps to become safe haven for the killers. We did not immediately call these crimes by their rightful name: genocide.66

C. Appraisal67

The genocide in Rwanda is a blot not only on the United Nations as an institution -- the Security Council, the Secretary-General, and the Secretariat -- but on other states not on the Security Council, as well. The AU’s Eminent Personalities’ report is appropriately titled “The Preventable Genocide,” because timely action could indeed have prevented it. It was widely known that hate radios, newspapers, and government officials were inciting people to violence and plans were in place to exterminate the enemy Tutsi who were called “cockroaches.” Dallaire’s January 11 cable gave ample warning, which required serious consideration and effective response, and there instead was the order to do nothing.

Lack of sufficient resources and adequate logistics and a very weak UNAMIR mandate were primary contributors to the inability of the force to prevent genocide. The confusion on rules of engagement must equally bear responsibility for the inaction. Dallaire received no guidance from UN Headquarters when he sought approval for his draft rules of engagement. There was no response to the request, and it was later revealed that “Headquarters did not have a procedure in place for the formal approval of draft Rules of Engagement.”68 And there were problems related to command and control, as well.
Once the massacres began after the plane crash on July 6 and President Habyarimana’s death, UNAMIR failed initially to protect government officials and political leaders and subsequently found itself incapable of protecting civilians. During the three months that atrocity crimes were being committed in Rwanda, the international community did nothing effective to halt those horrors, and thus simply allowed those heinous violations. Because of the overwhelming focus both at the UN and with Dallaire and Booh Booh on achieving a ceasefire and on the implementation of the Arusha accords, too little attention was paid to the actual massacres.

According to the Independent Inquiry Report, a force of 2,500 would have been able to stop or at least limit the brutal massacres. A 1998 report by thirteen experts to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, however, gave a different number, concluding that a force of 5,000 could have sufficed to prevent the killing, as a “window of opportunity . . . [existed from] about April 7 to April 21, 1994, when the political leaders of the violence were still susceptible to international influence.”

Writing a foreword to the report, Dallaire asserted that if there were the international will, the killings could have been prevented, and he called for swift and effective action by the international community in the future.

Among other contributing factors were the lack of adequate intelligence capability and lack of effective communication between Dallaire and UN Headquarters. Also, the Secretary-General did not play a strong role in bringing the gravity of the situation to the attention of the Security Council so that effective preventive action could have been taken, nor did he play an effective role in resolving the conflict.
The French-led “Opération Turquoise,” which the Security Council authorized under Chapter VII, but which was not under the UN command, was also hard to justify: 1) the OAU opposed it because of France’s deep ties to the Hutu, and 2) it was a Chapter VII operation, under which the use of force could be authorized, while UNAMIR was only a Chapter VI operation. As the Independent Inquiry Report observed, “[t]o have two operations present in the same conflict area with the authorization of the Security Council but with such diverging powers was problematic.”72

In sum, history will record the genocide in Rwanda, along with the killing fields of Cambodia and the Holocaust, as failures of humanity.

III. EVOLUTION OF THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT

A. 2005 World Summit’s Endorsement of Responsibility to Protect

In his message on the commemoration of the genocide in Rwanda on April 7, 2011, Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon said that the international community’s collective failure to prevent the tragedies of Rwanda and the Balkans led to the endorsement of the Responsibility to Protect principle by the UN World Summit in September in 2005.73 A few years earlier, on the 10th anniversary of the genocide, in an address to the UN Commission on Human Rights, his predecessor, Kofi Annan, unveiled his five-point “Action Plan to Prevent Genocide,”74 thereby implementing a recommendation made by members of the Independent Inquiry.75 He focused the second plank of his plan on states’ responsibility to protect civilians from violence, and the fourth plank on the appointment of a UN Special Adviser for Genocide Prevention, with the function of information gathering and early warning, and making recommendations to the Security Council on actions to prevent or halt genocide.
The fifth plank of the Secretary-General’s plan was on the need for “swift and decisive” action to respond to genocide. He referred to the “useful groundwork” done by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in its report, *Responsibility to Protect*, being considered by his High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. It was the High-Level Panel’s report that led to the endorsement by the UN World Summit in September 2005, mentioned by Ban Ki Moon in his message.

Kofi Annan, on whose watch the tragedies both in Rwanda (1994) and Srebrenica (1995) had occurred, was keen to implement the recommendations of the Independent Inquiry Report on Rwanda and the report on the fall of Srebrenica. Both reports had shown unambiguously that the international community could have prevented those events but lacked the will to do so. In his address to the Stockholm International Forum on January 26, 2004, Annan acknowledged that “[i]n both cases, the gravest mistakes were made by Member States, particularly in the way decisions were taken in the Security Council.” He complimented the ICISS, whose report, *The Responsibility to Protect*, he said, had “altered the terms of debate” on the dangers of inaction when massive violations of human rights occur.

The Secretary-General elaborated on this theme as he addressed the General Assembly while presenting his Annual Report in September 1999. There he asserted that globalization and international cooperation are redefining state sovereignty in light of the enhanced focus on human rights as enshrined in the UN Charter. Thus, he spoke about “the new commitment to intervention in the face of extreme suffering,” and discussed
the “developing international norm in favor of intervention to protect civilians from wholesale slaughter . . .”83

The next year, in his Millennium Report to the General Assembly in 2000, the Secretary-General responded to the critics’ concern that such intervention could “become a cover for gratuitous interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states.”84 While acknowledging the dilemma of humanitarian intervention,85 which he called “fraught with political difficulty,” he asked his critics, if the concept of humanitarian intervention is unacceptable because of its assault on sovereignty, how should the international community respond to gross and persistent violations of human rights?86

Eventually, in September 2005, the UN World Summit brought together heads of state and government, who adopted the World Summit Outcome Document,87 containing the core elements of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) concept in paragraphs 138 and 139. The basic element of the concept is that the state has the responsibility to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and their incitement.88 While accepting that responsibility, the leaders said that the international community is committed to assisting states so that they meet these obligations and to supporting the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability.89

The world leaders acknowledged the international community’s responsibility to use “diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means” in accordance with the UN Charter, to help to protect people from these crimes,90 and added that when peaceful means are inadequate and national authorities are “manifestly failing” to protect their populations from these crimes, they are prepared to act collectively “in a timely and
decisive manner,” through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter on a case-by-case basis. They stressed the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of this concept.

The ICISS report, as mentioned earlier, provided the basis for the Summit Document through its endorsement by the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel. In it, the Commission shifted the debate on humanitarian intervention from “right” to “responsibility” -- the “right to intervene” to the “responsibility to protect.” R2P was to comprise three distinct responsibilities -- to prevent, to react, which may include military intervention in extreme cases, and to rebuild after military intervention. The Commission further explained that the primary responsibility to protect “rests with the state concerned, and that it is only if the state is unable or unwilling to fulfill this responsibility, or is itself the perpetrator, that it becomes the responsibility of the international community to act in its place.”

The Commission proposed a “just cause threshold” for such intervention to be “serious and irreparable harm” to human beings and enumerated four precautionary principles for guidance on the use of force: right intention, last resort, proportional means, and reasonable prospects of success in halting or averting the suffering, “with the consequences of action not likely to be worse than the consequences of inaction.” The Commission identified the UN Security Council as the appropriate body to authorize military intervention.

Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s High-Level Panel endorsed in general the “emerging norm” of a collective international responsibility to protect, to be exercised by the Security Council authorizing military intervention as a last resort. The Panel
recommended that the Security Council and the General Assembly should embody these guidelines authorizing the use of force in declaratory resolutions.\textsuperscript{104} The Secretary-General accepted the Panel’s recommendations in a March 2005 report.\textsuperscript{105} Subsequently, in October 2005 the General Assembly adopted the Summit Outcome, which embodies the R2P concept,\textsuperscript{106} although a few states opposed the resolution, arguing that the concept violates sovereignty. For example, Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez called R2P “very dangerous” because it “shapes imperialism [and] interventionism” in the attempt “to legalize the violation of national sovereignty.”\textsuperscript{107}

B. R2P’s Evolution and Development Since 2005

During the next year, the Security Council adopted two resolutions related to R2P. The first was Resolution 1674 on the protection of civilians in armed conflict in April 2006, in which the Council reaffirmed the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139.\textsuperscript{108} In the second resolution, on the deployment of UN peacekeepers in Darfur, the Security Council incorporated the doctrine by referring to the “responsibility of the Government of The Sudan, to protect civilians under threat of physical violence.”\textsuperscript{109}

The concept, however, lay dormant without any UN deliberations or action until the General Assembly’s adoption of the resolution, \textit{The Responsibility to Protect}, in October 2009, in which it took note of both the report of the Secretary-General, \textit{Implementing the Responsibility to Protect} of January 29, 2009, and the subsequent deliberations in the General Assembly in July, and decided to continue its consideration of the Responsibility to Protect.\textsuperscript{110} It seems that the US invasion of Iraq had a chilling effect on the development of the concept, even though the US had not invoked R2P to justify its invasion. However, during this period, civil society and scholars, as well as the
special adviser to the Secretary-General on R2P, Edward Luck, were creating general awareness of the concept and actively promoting its implementation.\footnote{111}

Kofi Annan’s successor, Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon, deserves credit for his efforts in moving the concept from rhetoric to reality. He defended and clarified it in his address in Berlin in July 2008, where he called it “one of the more powerful but less understood ideas of our times.” and added:

RtoP is not a new code for humanitarian intervention. Rather, it is built on a more positive and affirmative concept of sovereignty as responsibility -- a concept developed by my Special Adviser for the Prevention of Genocide, Francis Deng, and his colleagues at the Brookings Institution more than a decade ago. RtoP should be also distinguished from its conceptual cousin, human security. The latter, which is broader, posits that policy should take into account the security of people, not just of States, across the whole range of possible threats.\footnote{112}

Subsequently, in January 2009, he provided both a conceptual and a practical framework for implementing the concept in a report to the General Assembly.\footnote{113} This was the first comprehensive UN document aimed at turning the concept into policy.

In his report, the Secretary-General highlighted the three pillars of R2P: 1) the protection responsibilities of the state as the “bedrock” of the concept: states have the primary responsibility to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity;\footnote{114} 2) international assistance and capacity-building: the international community’s commitment to provide assistance to states in building capacity aimed at protecting their populations from these crimes and to assisting those which are “under stress before crises and conflicts break out”;\footnote{115} and 3) timely and decisive response: on the international community’s responsibility to take “timely and decisive” action to prevent and halt these crimes when a state is “manifestly failing” to protect its populations. This pillar enumerates options for the use of an array of tools to
protect citizens from mass atrocities, including collaboration with regional and sub-regional organizations under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, and, with Security Council authorization, coercive measures under Chapter VII. The General Assembly may also play an active role as provided for in Charter Articles 10-14 and under the “Uniting for Peace” process.

In each of the three pillars Secretary-General Ban provided recommendations for states. In pillar 3, he proposed a number of steps for the United Nations and/or regional or sub-regional organizations. In another section of the report, The Way Forward, the Secretary-General made specific recommendations for the General Assembly, especially urging the Assembly to begin consideration of the strategy for implementing the concept. He specially called upon the Member States not to revisit the prior negotiations that led to the adoption of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the Summit Outcome, since those provisions will save lives by preventing the most egregious mass violations of human rights. The report emphasized the important role of early warning in implementing R2P, as well. Ban also noted that he would be submitting to the General Assembly a proposal for a joint office for the Special Adviser for the Prevention of Genocide and the Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect.

The report made a convincing case for the wider acceptance of R2P. After recounting the horrible tragedies of the 20th Century -- the Holocaust, Cambodia, Rwanda, and Srebrenica -- it called for the political will and capacity of the international community to do better in the 21st. Asserting that the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the Summit Outcome are firmly anchored in conventional and customary international law principles, the Secretary-General emphasized that R2P reinforces
Member States’ legal obligations to refrain from the use of force as the provisions of these paragraphs are to be undertaken only in conformity with the UN Charter.\textsuperscript{119}

The Secretary-General described the impressive developments in Africa in redefining sovereignty and especially referred to the AU Constitutive Act, which provides for “the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect to grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity.”\textsuperscript{120} It should also be noted that the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights had adopted a resolution in November 2007 in which it reaffirmed “the call made in the September 2005 United Summit Declaration for Cooperation between the United Nations and Regional Organizations, to help populations from . . . grave threats” of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.\textsuperscript{121}

Calling R2P an ally of sovereignty, the Secretary-General clarified that the scope of the concept should be kept narrow, limited to the four specified crimes and violations mentioned in the Summit Outcome. At the same time he called for a “deep response,” when needed, by utilizing the toolkit of all the prevention and protection measures and instruments available to the UN system, regional and sub-regional organizations, and civil society.\textsuperscript{122}

The General Assembly debated the R2P for three days in July 2009. The Secretary-General addressed the Assembly on July 21, 2009, on the eve of its consideration of his report, \textit{Implementing the Responsibility to Protect}.\textsuperscript{123} In presenting the report he asserted that prevention should be “job number one,” as it offers a balanced and nuanced approach that utilizes all the tools available to the UN, especially the
involvement initially of the regional and sub-regional organizations. He said that when prevention fails, the UN must pursue an “early and flexible response” on a case-by-case basis and in accordance with the UN charter. Military action, he added, “is a measure of last, not first, resort and should only be undertaken in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.”\textsuperscript{124} He urged Member States to “resist those who try to change the subject or turn our common effort to curb the worst atrocities in human history into a struggle over ideology, geography or economics.”\textsuperscript{125}

He noted that, while there was convergence on the first two pillars of his strategy -- state responsibility and international assistance -- differences nonetheless persisted in the area of response. Thus he called upon Member States to keep the dialogue going, “building on what has been achieved and setting markers for the future.”\textsuperscript{126} Referring to the Rwandan genocide and the victims of mass atrocities in the 20th Century, he said: “Our publics judged us then, and found us wanting. They will be watching again this week, and they will -- rightfully -- judge us harshly if we treat these deliberations as politics as usual.”\textsuperscript{127}

The General Assembly met over a period of three days and during the debate, which was “the most intense and extensive,” as noted by the President of the General Assembly, Miguel d’Escoto Brockmann (Nicaragua), 94 speakers expressed their opinions and concerns.\textsuperscript{128} The President, in a concept note he annexed to a letter to Member States, criticized R2P and, referring to the Charter provisions, he claimed that none of them “would cover responsibility to protect unless the situation is a threat to international peace and security . . . . The discretion given to the Security Council to decide a threat to international peace and security implies a variable commitment totally
different from the consistent alleviation of suffering embodied in the responsibility to protect.”

However, a large number of delegates showed strong support for the Secretary-General’s “Three Pillars” approach and for continuing the dialogue. Several delegates showed an appreciation for the concept of “sovereignty as responsibility,” and emphasized the importance of prevention. Most delegates also emphasized the need for prevention and early warning mechanisms. But concerns were also expressed about the composition of the Security Council and the need for reform, and several delegates stressed that the Council must not act selectively and the principle not be misused. The need for a threshold for the use of coercive measures and for the enhanced role of the General Assembly in implementing R2P was also expressed.

Among those most critical, some equating R2P to the discredited humanitarian intervention and several questioning its legitimacy, included Cuba, Sudan, Pakistan, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Notwithstanding their criticism and the vocal skepticism of a few others, the strong support for the R2P concept was eventually instrumental in the General Assembly’s adoption of its resolution aimed at continuing the dialogue on R2P.

The General Assembly has kept its promise of continuing to discuss R2P. The next focus of the Secretary-General was on early warning and assessment, areas in which the UN was found wanting in its performance related to the Rwandan genocide, and in 2010 the General Assembly held an informal interactive dialogue on the theme. In his report on these issues to the Assembly preceding the informal dialogue in July 2010, entitled *Early Warning, Assessment and the Responsibility to Protect*, the Secretary-
General referred to the UN assessment reports on its inaction in both the Rwanda\textsuperscript{139} and Srebrenica tragedies.\textsuperscript{140} On both these occasions several gaps were identified, such as the UN’s weakness in its analytical capacity, its insufficient focus on institutional resources for early warning and risk analysis, and the lack of sufficient information sharing.\textsuperscript{141}

The Secretary-General noted that despite the UN’s efforts over the past decade to address some of the specific issue areas in these gaps,\textsuperscript{142} the three gaps still remain in “providing the timely information and assessment needed to implement the Responsibility to Protect in a balanced, responsible, and vigorous manner:” 1) there is insufficient sharing of information and analysis; 2) with the exception of the early warning mechanism on the prevention of genocide, the existing mechanisms do not view the information gathered and analyzed “through the lens of the responsibility to protect”; and 3) there is also a lack of “a continuous and candid process of assessment and reassessment that utilizes the full range of information on, and analysis of, a given situation available to the United Nations system.”\textsuperscript{143} He stressed the need for the regular two-way flow of information between the UN and its regional and subregional partners on “early warning, assessment, and timely and decisive response,” as well as information sharing between governments and the United Nations.\textsuperscript{144}

The Secretary-General highlighted the role of his special adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, Francis Deng, and his special adviser on the Responsibility to Protect, Edward Luck, and proposed that there be a joint office for these two functions.\textsuperscript{145} Their task would be to gather information and assess situations that might lead to mass atrocity crimes, and advise the Secretary-General, and through him the Security Council and other relevant inter-government organizations. Thus, he said, this joint office would
primarily address the two major existing gaps in the UN system -- a lack of sufficient sharing of information across the system and an inability to provide timely response and recommendations to the appropriate intergovernmental bodies. He also suggested that the Assembly discuss in its next interactive dialogue in 2010 the role of regional and subregional organizations in implementing the responsibility to protect.\textsuperscript{146}

The General Assembly held its informal dialogue on August 9, 2010. The debate was preceded by a panel discussion in which both the special advisers participated.\textsuperscript{147} While several states supported the Secretary-General’s proposal for a joint office, concerns were raised, for example by India, arguing that the process “must be Member State driven.” There was overall support for the R2P, however, a few states were critical in a similar vein as in the 2009 dialogue. The Secretary-General’s suggestion for the next interactive dialogue to be on the role of regional and sub-regional organizations in implementing R2P was welcomed by the General Assembly. Subsequently, in December 2010, the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly overwhelmingly accepted the Secretary-General’s proposal to create a joint office of the special advisers.\textsuperscript{148}

The next informal interactive dialogue, on the role of regional and subregional arrangements in implementing R2P, took place on July 12, 2011, and the Secretary-General issued a report on the subject on June 27, 2011.\textsuperscript{149} The report focused on regional initiatives undertaken to support the Three Pillars of R2P. The Secretary-General highlighted the collaboration and partnership between the United Nations Secretariat and the Security Council on the one hand and the regional and sub-regional organizations on the other, and noted the ongoing contacts between his special advisers and regional groups on thematic issues as well as on specific country situations.
The Secretary-General noted some of the relatively well-developed relationships, “such as with the High Commissioner for National Minorities of the OSCE, the African Union, the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region, and the European Union.” With others, “such as with ASEAN, ECOWAS, the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD), the Organization of American States (OAS) and the League of Arab States,” the relationships are at an earlier stage of development, and broadening and deepening these relationships was a matter of high priority. He suggested assessing “efforts to date to utilize all of the tools of Chapters VI, VII, and VIII in implementing the third pillar of my strategy” as the focus for the following year’s dialogue.

On July 12, the Secretary-General addressed the General Assembly, thanking the Assembly President for convening the dialogue. He noted that the R2P principle is being developed at the United Nations conceptually, politically, and operationally through several reports and dialogues and has now “become an operational reality,” as both the Security Council and the Human Rights Council have invoked R2P over the last year. He reminded the Assembly that the UN’s efforts to promote and protect human rights and the rule of law have been impressive because of the work on conflict prevention, mediation, peacekeeping, and peace-building. “Now we can do the same for atrocity prevention,” he exhorted. He, however, acknowledged that the record is still mixed at every level -- global, regional, sub-regional, and national, and anticipated the dialogue would “open a sustained cross-regional conversation on lessons learned and practical experiences.”

IV. THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND LIBYA
Following the uprisings in Egypt, Tunisia, and several other in the Middle East and North Africa, Libya also witnessed protests and demonstrations against the regime of Colonel Muammar Khadafi. The regime used brute force against civilians to crush the opposition. Khadafi told his supporters, “Come out of your homes. Attack [the opposition] in their dens,” calling the protesters “cockroaches” and “rats” who did not deserve to live. The Security Council, in its first ever invocation of R2P, adopted a resolution on February 26, 2011, imposing sanctions on Libya. I consider this to be an appropriate action.

The Council condemned the violence and use of force by the Libyan government against civilians and welcomed the earlier similar condemnation by the Arab League, the African Union, and the Secretary-General of the Organization of Islamic Conference. It also welcomed the Human Rights Council’s decision to appoint an independent international commission of inquiry to investigate alleged violations of international human rights law. It demanded an immediate end to the violence, urging the Libyan authorities to “[a]ct with the utmost restraint, respect human rights and international humanitarian law.” It also decided to refer the situation to the International Criminal Court. The sanctions the Council imposed against Libya included an arms embargo, a travel ban against 16 named Libyan government officials, including Khadafi, his sons and daughter, and freezing of assets of the Khadafi family. It also established a new sanctions committee. The Council expressed its readiness to consider taking appropriate measures, as necessary.

As the Libyan situation worsened and Khadafi continued his brutal oppression in defiance of the Security Council’s earlier resolution, resulting in heavy civilian
casualties, the Council adopted another resolution on March 17, 2011. Referring to the Arab League’s decision to call for the imposition of a no-fly zone on Libya, the Security Council authorized Member States “to take all necessary measures . . . to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack . . . while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form” on any part of Libya. It also established a no-fly zone and further strengthened the sanctions imposed in the earlier resolution -- the arms embargo, ban on flying, and asset freeze.

Meanwhile, the UN Human Rights Council was also concerned with the Libyan situation. It adopted a resolution on February 25, 2011, pursuant to which the President of the Council established the International Commission of Inquiry to investigate alleged violations of international human rights law in Libya. The Commission, chaired by Professor Cherif Bassiouni, submitted its detailed report on June 1, 2011. A week later, in presenting the Commission report to the Human Rights Council meeting scheduled to consider it, Bassiouni said that the Commission found the government forces and their supporters to have committed acts constituting murder, unlawful imprisonment, and serious violations of international law, including torture, persecution, and enforced disappearance. These violations were part of widespread and systematic attacks against the civilian population and are within the meaning of “crimes against humanity” under customary international law and as defined in the International Criminal Court’s statute, art. VII. Also, the report found that the government forces had committed serious violations of international humanitarian law which amounted to “war crimes.”
Subsequently, on June 27, the International Criminal Court issued warrants of arrest for Khadafi, his son Saif Al-Islam Khadafi, and Libya’s Intelligence Chief, Abdulla Al-Senussi on charges of crimes against humanity (murder and persecution) committed through the state apparatus and security forces. The ICC prosecutor had decided to open an investigation on March 3, 2011, and had requested the judges of the Court on May 16 to issue these warrants. It should be noted that since Libya is not a party to the Rome statute that created the Court, it is subject to the ICC’s jurisdiction through UN Security Council Resolution 1970, discussed above.

Pursuant to the call in Resolution 1973 authorizing Member States “to take all necessary measures . . . to protect civilians,” NATO promptly began its air campaign against Khadafi’s forces. The context was the imminent attack on Benghazi by Khadhafi’s forces and the expected resulting massacre. President Barack Obama in his address to the nation on Libya on March 28 offered the rationale for using force:

Qaddafi declared he would show “no mercy” to his own people. He compared them to rats, and threatened to go door to door to inflict punishment. In the past, we have seen him hang civilians in the streets, and kill over a thousand people in a single day. Now we saw regime forces in the outskirts of the city. We knew that if we . . . waited one more day, Benghazi, a city nearly the size of Charlotte, could suffer a massacre that would have reverberated across the region and stained the conscience of the world.

As the war dragged on, the US, along with many other countries recognized the Benghazi-based National Transitional Council (NTC) as the legitimate government representing Libya. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said at an international meeting in Istanbul held to discuss the Libyan conflict, “We will help the TNC sustain its commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Libya, and we will look to it to remain steadfast in its commitment to human rights and
fundamental freedoms.” Because of the recognition by the United States, the rebels could claim the money the US had earlier frozen pursuant to the Security Council resolution imposing sanctions. With the Ramadan holy days beginning on August 1, efforts continued to find a political solution to the Libyan crisis. However, the solution was military rather than political, with Col. Khadafi overthrown more than five months after the Security Council resolution and NATO’s air campaign to enforce the resolution. By the start of September, NATO and the UN were helping the transition process.

In March 2011 the civilian population in Ivory Coast was also suffering from brutal suppression at the hands of the forces of incumbent President Laurent Gbagbo, who had lost the presidential election but refused to let the winner assume power. This resulted in widespread violence. In addressing the crisis, the Security Council used R2P by implication without explicitly invoking it for political reasons, in its resolution 1975 on March 30, 2011. In the preamble, the Security Council reiterated that “parties to armed conflicts bear the primary responsibility to take all feasible steps to ensure the protection of civilians and facilitate the rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian assistance and the safety of humanitarian personnel.”

The Security Council authorized UNOCI, the UN peacekeeping forces, “to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate to protect civilians under imminent threat of political violence . . . , including to prevent the use of heavy weapons against the civilian population.” It also imposed financial and travel sanctions against specified individuals. The Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that pursuant to resolution 1975 he had “instructed the mission to take the necessary measures to prevent the use of heavy weapons against the civilian population with the support of the French
forces pursuant to . . . Security Council resolution 1962 (2010),” and on April 4, UNOCI undertook a military operation to accomplish that objective.188

Critics have raised questions about the need for the use of force in Libya, especially as no such action was taken against Syria or in several other places, such as The Congo and Sudan. It is argued, for example, that the R2P concept is “abstract enough to cover, and legitimate, a range of military interventions.”189 Another critic, David Rieff, asserts, “As the Libyan case illustrates, R2P’s most immediate relevance is that it can be used quickly and effectively as a legal and moral justification for military intervention.”190

The answer to the critics, which will be further elaborated in the next part, is, in a nutshell, that the concept is still evolving and the Security Council must agree on standards to determine when the threshold for the use of force has been crossed. The ICISS had suggested the four precautionary principles for guidance on the use of force, which should be further considered. Under R2P the use of force remains a last resort with the primary focus on prevention and peaceful means of settling disputes, as contained in Chapter VI of the UN Charter. In the final analysis it is a political question and hence it is apt to be unevenly applied, given the composition of the Security Council and the Charter’s veto provision.

V. APPRAISAL AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Before I address the question posed in the title of this essay, is the international community ready for the emerging norm of R2P?, it is necessary to consider three preliminary issues related to R2P’s implementation: 1) the scope and function of this
emerging norm; 2) institutional arrangements for its implementation; and 3) its current status. The inconsistent, selective application of R2P thus far needs to be discussed, as well.

A. Scope and Function

Secretary-General Ban explained the scope of the concept as limited to the four mass atrocity crimes of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, as well as their incitement, as discussed earlier. He also emphasized the depth of the concept as it embodies a whole range of peaceful means of settling disputes, including diplomatic efforts, the Chapter VI mechanisms, to wit, “negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, . . . or other peaceful means,” Chapter VII Security Council recommendations and non-coercive measures, and Chapter VIII regional arrangements.194

As discussed earlier, R2P’s focus remains primarily on prevention and the international community’s assistance to states so that they can comply with their obligations to protect populations from the four crimes.195 It is only when these methods do not work and a state is “manifestly failing” to protect its population that the international community is committed to taking “timely and decisive” action to prevent and halt these crimes.

David Rieff contends that, but for the use of force, other elements of R2P, which constitute the primary focus of the concept -- diplomacy, prevention, sanctions, etc. -- depend for their effective application on whether states where mass atrocity crimes are possible can be identified because the list of such states is very long, and whether the resources exist to provide the needed assistance to those prevent atrocities. He concludes
that the ability to identify such states and the resources necessary are simply not present.  

Rieff certainly has a valid argument about the lack of sufficient resources to provide a 21st Century Marshall Plan for all those countries in need. Similarly, his assertion is unassailable that the ability of the existing international mechanisms falls short of identifying all likely trouble spots where these crimes might happen. Nonetheless, what follows from these assertions is not the conclusion that the menu options available under the first two pillars named by Secretary-General Ban do not work and should be discarded. He, of course, does not say it in so many words, but he does imply that the R2P goals other than the use of force are simply irrelevant as there is no international capacity or commitment to accomplish them.

As an illustration of the use of these R2P tools considered irrelevant by Rieff, Professor Bellamy discusses Kenya after the disputed December 2007 elections, where internationally brokered diplomatic efforts by the African Union under the leadership of Kofi Annan and supported by the UN Secretary-General, brought about a power-sharing agreement that prevented what otherwise might have led to mass atrocities. The President of the Security Council in a statement “urge[d] Kenya’s political leaders to foster reconciliation and to elaborate and implement the actions agreed to . . . without delay, including by meeting their responsibility to engage fully in finding a sustainable political solution and taking action to end immediately violence.”

In the Ivory Coast in November 2004, another situation noted by Secretary-General Ban, then special adviser on the prevention of genocide, Juan Méndez, reminded the authorities there that they could be held criminally responsible for the consequences
of xenophobic hate speech, which was exacerbating domestic tensions and had spurred further violence. Such messages did cease after his communication.\textsuperscript{201}

And despite the lack of ample resources, those that can be marshaled and used internationally, regionally, or unilaterally, will permit at least some of those risky situations to be identified and paid appropriate attention. For even if available resources do not suffice to address all at-risk situations, does providing assistance and building capacity in as many situations as possible not serve the R2P goal of preventing and deterring mass atrocities?

Once the situation reaches the third pillar, the question, who can take coercive action on behalf of the international community? is unequivocally answered by identifying the UN Security Council. However, there is no guidance as to when the threshold for action is reached. In the Libyan context the debate continues whether R2P was wisely invoked by the Security Council to authorize coercive action.\textsuperscript{202} As the events unfolded, given Khadafi’s prior record, combined with his threats to the rebels and with his armies swiftly closing in on Benghazi, a city of 700,000 people, the risk of potential massive atrocities was instrumental in the Security Council’s decision to respond quickly to the crisis that was moving much faster. There is, however, no adequate response to critics who might ask whether the first two pillars of R2P were applied; and if so, how effectively and if not, why not?\textsuperscript{203}

A related criticism of the Libyan intervention is that the limited mandate from the Security Council to use coercion to protect civilians was stretched, as evidenced by the calls from the United States and France, among other western countries, to remove Khadafi even prior to the NATO intervention, which left no doubt about their goal to
bring about a regime change. Thus, the Libyan intervention, especially the perceived 
“mission creep” and the lingering crisis there, has indeed added further challenges to the 
operationalization of the concept. Also, military power, once unleashed, is by its nature 
imprecise in its application as it is likely to result in civilian deaths justified as 
“collateral” damage. Unfortunately, the Libyan operation might have the unintended 
consequence of discrediting the concept and weakening its political support and 
acceptance, giving ammunition to those who might equate R2P with “humanitarian 
intervention wine in new bottles,” or “imperialism in disguise.”

As to R2P’s functions, Professor Alex Bellamy considers one function to describe 
a political commitment to prevent and halt genocide and mass atrocities, “accompanied 
by a policy agenda in need of implementation.” The second R2P function he identifies 
is to generate a “speech act,” meaning specific communicative functions through words 
and sentences such as promises and warnings, so that R2P serves as a catalyst for action. 
Regarding the first function, he argues that R2P is universal and enduring, and is widely 
accepted, although the policy agenda it generates needs further clarification for its 
implementation, as the implementation has not yet begun in earnest. He appropriately 
considers this approach to be aimed at presenting

R2P as a broad-based policy agenda focused on the “upstream” prevention of 
genocide and mass atrocities through capacity-building and international 
cooperation, and to focus attention on developing the institutions and capacities 
for effective response within the prevailing normative framework, while keeping in mind the need to martial “timely and decisive” responses to atrocities when 
needed.

Bellamy finds these two functions incompatible and argues that this causes 
confusion regarding the way R2P is used. I concur with the response of Edward Luck,
the Secretary-General’s special adviser on R2P, who contends that, while these two approaches cannot be simultaneously embraced as R2P’s primary function, they are not necessarily incompatible -- and could even be mutually reinforcing -- if a call to action is seen as not necessarily a call to coercive action, but a preventive action or an international cooperative action aimed at capacity building.

B. Institutional Arrangements

The Secretary-General’s 2009 Report, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, and the General Assembly debate on the report set the stage for addressing institutional deficiencies pointed out by the UN commissions in their reports on Rwanda and Srebrenica, and for coordinating and strengthening institutional arrangements. The process was furthered in 2010 with the Secretary-General’s presentation of his report, entitled Early Warning, Assessment, and the Responsibility to Protect, and subsequently the General Assembly’s dialogue discussing it.

The Secretary-General outlined the institutional arrangements needed for the “effective, credible and sustainable implementation” of R2P, which in turn calls for “early and flexible response tailored to the circumstances of each case.” To accomplish this goal, the Secretary-General proposed a joint office between his two special advisers that would institutionalize the collaboration between them and strengthen the existing institutional arrangements, “including for capacity-building and for the gathering and analysis of information from the field.” The General Assembly’s acceptance of the proposal is indeed a very promising development.

The Secretary-General’s 2011 report on the role of regional and sub regional arrangements in implementing R2P was the next step in furthering the process.
he highlighted the need for enhancing the cooperation between the UN Secretariat and
the regional and subregional counterparts\textsuperscript{220} and between his special advisers and
regional bodies.\textsuperscript{221}

These developments show remarkable progress made in less than two short years
since the General Assembly adopted its first resolution to continue the dialogue on the
topic.\textsuperscript{222}

C. Current Status of the Responsibility to Protect

Although discussions in the General Assembly on R2P have shown overwhelming
support for the concept so far as it is understood to be aimed at state responsibility to
prevent and halt the four atrocity crimes, the baggage of history surrounding the abuse of
“humanitarian intervention” by major powers cannot be ignored. I vividly recall my
presentation on R2P in December 2009 at a special meeting convened by the Indian
Society of International Law in New Delhi. Present were international law scholars and
budding scholars, as well. The widespread skepticism my presentation generated was
palpable. Such skepticism is obviously not confined to New Delhi, but in varying
degrees is shared by the global south.

Secretary-General Ban and both his special advisers -- on the prevention of
genocide and responsibility to protect -- have been actively engaged in consulting with
State officials and intergovernmental organizations, especially Chapter VIII regional
bodies, in promoting and clarifying the concept, studying policy options, working on the
gaps identified by the Secretary-General in his reports, and exploring the practical steps
needed for its operationalization. Efforts to build a strong constituency of states and civil
society to support the concept and be on board to consider means to operationalize it are a
necessary first step for moving the concept beyond rhetoric. As states and the public feel comfortable with the concept and it gradually becomes part of the popular culture, it no doubt will influence state behavior and conduct. States then will take appropriate measures in cooperation with the UN and regional organizations to operationalize R2P.

D. Inconsistent Application of R2P in Practice

In the brief history of its application, R2P indeed has a mixed record, as shown by Professor Bellamy after his study of nine crises where the principle has been invoked and four others where one or more of the four R2P crimes were either committed or threatened without R2P being invoked. In the case of Georgia (2008), Russia invoked the principle but several governments rejected it and there was no support for the Russian claims, as governments and analysts found no evidence of R2P crimes. Similarly, invoking R2P, the French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner called upon the UN Security Council in the Myanmar situation, when on May 3, 2008, Cyclone Nirgis caused 138,000 deaths and displacement of 1.5 million, to authorize humanitarian assistance without Myanmar’s consent. The rationale for this invocation was that denial of such assistance constituted a crime against humanity. Again there was no support for such invocation and there was consensus that in case of natural disasters R2P is inappropriate.

Other cases Bellamy has studied in which R2P was invoked are Kenya (2007-2008), Sudan (Darfur, 2003-ongoing), Sri Lanka (2008-2009), the Myanmar government’s ongoing conflicts with ethnic minorities, the ongoing conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the ongoing problems in North Korea, and the Israeli use of force in Gaza (2009); and the cases in which it was not invoked are Sudan (the north-
south conflicts ongoing since 2008), Somalia (ongoing conflict since 2006), Iraq
(ongoing conflicts since 2003), and Afghanistan (ongoing conflicts since 2001). Among
these countries, Kenya was the only one where under the auspices of the African Union
and with the assistance of the UN Secretary-General mediation efforts succeeded. In
Libya, where for the first time the Security Council has applied the third pillar R2P in
authorizing the use of force, NATO’s help has been critical in the overthrow of the
Khadafi regime.

Edward Luck, whose task is to study these crises, acknowledges that the
application of policy measures in response remains “somewhat selective.” The reason is
that politics and national preferences affect not only responses by the Security Council,
the General Assembly, and the African Union, but also these bodies’ appraisal of the
chances of success of their action.

E. Is the International Community Ready to Embrace the Responsibility to
Protect?

As mentioned earlier, R2P is accepted as a concept without any serious challenge
by an overwhelming number of states. However, as the Secretary-General and Edward
Luck have repeatedly acknowledged, much more needs to be done to further clarify the
concept and work on policy and institutional issues to eventually accomplish the goal of
its operationalization and implementation.

Based upon the study thus far, there is no clear answer on how the Security
Council is required to act “in a timely and decisive manner,” on a case-by-case basis,
when peaceful means are inadequate and national authorities are “manifestly failing” to
protect their populations from atrocity crimes, which was mandated by the world leaders
in the 2005 Summit Outcome Document. Thus, the need for guidelines and criteria is evident. This critical issue is especially highlighted by the Security Council’s authorization to protect citizens in Libya, as questions have arisen about the wisdom of such authorization.

Because any decision taken by the Security Council and actions undertaken by governments or regional organizations invariably depend on the political considerations involved it is unrealistic yet to expect consistency in practice. The next step should be for the Security Council and the General Assembly to discuss the criteria to determine 1) when a threshold for collective coercive action has been reached and 2) the nature of the coercive measures to be taken. The Secretary-General’s High Level Panel had recommended the basic criteria -- seriousness of threat, proper purpose, last resort, proper means, and balance of consequences. If the General Assembly continues its discussion of R2P in 2012 on the topic suggested by the Secretary-General, assessing efforts in implementing the third pillar of his strategy, a serious discussion on the needed criteria will be helpful.

Professor Bellamy raises another serious question, whether the second and third pillars of the Secretary-General’s R2P strategy should even be considered norms, since demands imposed by these pillars are indeterminate and this weakens R2P’s “compliance-pull” as is evident by state practice in several recent crises. Edward Luck considers this question to be a red herring. In response he explains:

What RtoP brings to the existing norms on genocide prevention, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, in fact, is the nucleus of a multilateral compliance mechanism. . . . [T]he binding quality of its decisions makes the [Security] Council unique. It is not about to be bound by others or to be told how it must act.
As an emerging norm, R2P is “soft law.” Every student of international law knows that it takes time for soft law to be transformed into either conventional law or customary international law. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides an apt illustration. At the time of its adoption by the General Assembly Eleanor Roosevelt called it “a statement of principles . . . setting up a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations,” asserting further that the Declaration was “not a treaty or international agreement . . . imposing legal obligations.” Who can today dismiss or ignore the Declaration, whose provisions have come to influence state conduct much more effectively than many conventional laws?

In a nutshell, it is too early to tell how soon the international community will operationalize and implement the responsibility to protect, which simply reflects the tension between the age-old tradition of sovereignty and the contemporary aspirations of human rights. The idea take root that sovereignty and responsibility to protect are indeed compatible is slowly gaining acceptance. As discussed above, the UN Secretary-General is taking concrete steps toward its operationalization. And there is no question that the collective action under R2P to prevent and halt atrocities is a preferred alternative to the much discredited unilateral intervention.

2 Independent Inquiry Report, supra note 1, at 3.


6 Supra note 2.

7 Supra note 3.

8 THE PREVENTABLE GENOCIDE, supra note 4, chapters 1-13.

9 Id. chapter 7: The Road to Genocide: 1990-1993, para. 4

10 Id. para. 24. For an account of anti-Tutsi propaganda by both the print and electronic media, see generally id. paras. 19-26. See also LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY, supra note 5, at 31-95, especially “Propaganda and Practice,” at 65-95. As the Human Rights Watch study reports, in the episodes of violence from 1990-1994, Habyarimana’s supporters perfected some of the tactics they would use during the genocide: how to choose the best sites to launch attacks, how to develop the violence -- both in intensity and in extent -- from small beginnings, how to mobilize people through fear, particularly fear aroused by “created” events, how to use barriers and bureaucratic regulations to keep a target group restricted to one place, and how to build cooperation between civilian, military, and militia leaders to produce the most effective attacks. Perhaps equally important, they had learned that this kind of slaughter would be tolerated by the international community. Id. at 95.


12 See generally id. chapter 6: The 1990 Invasion. The following account is based primarily on the OAU Report of Eminent Personalities and the Human Rights Watch reports.

13 LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY, supra note 5, at 87.

14 Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Human Rights Abuse in Rwanda, March 8, 1993, at 51. The Commission’s statement was based on substantial data it had gathered.

15 See generally THE PREVENTABLE GENOCIDE, supra note 4, chapter 8: The Arusha Peace Process.


21 For a detailed study of these warnings which is chronologically presented, see *Leave None to Tell the Story*, supra note 5, at 141-172.


23 *Id.* at 16. This was the response from Assistant Secretary-General Iqbal Riza after Dallaire had called to inform him that UNAMIR might have to use force to save the Prime Minister who had taken refuge at the UN Volunteer Compound in Kigali.

24 For an account of the events preceding the genocide, see generally *id.* at 10-15; *The Preventable Genocide, supra* note 4, chapter 9: *The Eve of the Genocide: What the World Knew; Leave None to Tell the Story*, *supra* note 5, at 143-79.


26 *Id.* op. para. 4.


28 *Id.* at 23.


30 *Id.* paras. 22-23.

31 *Id.* para. 24.

32 See generally Independent Inquiry Report, *supra* note 1, at 15-29; 66-75; *The Preventable Genocide, supra* note 4, at chapter 14: *The Genocide; Leave None to Tell the Story, supra* note 5, at 180-691.

33 *The Preventable Genocide, supra* note 4, chapter 14: *The Genocide*, para. 42.

34 Quoted in *id.* para. 4.

35 *Id.* para. 26.

36 *Id.* (citation omitted).

37 *Id.* para. 27.

38 See generally *Leave None to Tell the Story, supra* note 5, *Propaganda and Practice*, at 65-95.

39 *Supra* note 18.


41 *Id.* at 15.


44 *Id.* at 21.

45 *Id.* at 21-22.


56 Secretary-General’s Statement, *supra* note 3.

57 See generally *Leave None to Tell the Story, supra* note 5, at 618-623; *The Preventable Genocide, supra* note 4, at ch. 15, paras. 42-52.

58 *The Preventable Genocide, supra* note 4, ch. 15: *The World During the Genocide: The United Nations, Belgium, France and the OAU*, para. 52.

59 See generally *id.* paras. 53-85.

60 Independent Inquiry Report, *supra* note 1, at 49 [italics in original].

61 *The Preventable Genocide, supra* note 4, ch. 15: *The World During the Genocide: The United Nations, Belgium, France and the OAU*, para. 68.


As Scheffer writes, “We were still reeling from the Somalia debacle, which heavily affected how U.S. policy-makers viewed foreign engagements,” *supra* note 62, at 131.


For the UN Commission’s detailed conclusions and recommendations, see generally Independent Inquiry Report, *supra* note 1, at 30-59.


Independent Inquiry Report, *supra* note 1, at 49. See also *The Preventable Genocide*, *supra* note 4, chapter 15: *The World During the Genocide: The United Nations, Belgium, France and the OAU*, para. 85: “The consequences of French policy can hardly be overestimated. The escape of génocidaires leaders into Zaire led, almost inevitably to a new, more complex stage in the Rwandan tragedy, expanding it into a conflict that soon engulfed all of central Africa.”


From the Secretary-General, *Genocide is a Threat to Peace, Requiring Strong, United Action*, 41 UN Chronicle No. 1, at 4 (2004).


On humanitarian intervention, see generally V.S. MANI, *HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION TODAY 313 Recueil Des Cours (2005); SEAN D. MURPHY, *HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE UNITED NATIONS IN AN EVOLVING WORLD ORDER* (1996); FERNANDO TÉSON, *HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO...*

Id. at 48.

86 Id. at 48.
87 Summit Outcome Document, supra note 78.
88 Id. para. 138.
89 Id.
90 Id. para. 139.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 It should be especially noted that in the mid 1990s, Francis Deng and his colleagues at the Brookings Institution had been redefining the concept of “sovereignty as responsibility.” FRANCIS M. DENG, ET AL., SOVEREIGNTY AS RESPONSIBILITY: CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN AFRICA (The Brookings Institution 1996). See also Francis Deng, Frontiers of Sovereignty, 8 Leiden J. Int'l L. 249 (1995). Deng was then the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons and currently serves as the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide.
94 ICISS Report, supra note 76, paras. 3.1-3.43.
95 Id. paras. 4.1-4.43.
96 Id. paras. 5.1-5.31.
97 Id. para. 2.29.
98 Id. paras. 4.18-4.19.
99 Id. para. 4.33.
100 Id. para. 4.37.
101 Id. para. 4.39.
102 Id. para. 4.41.
103 Id. at xii.
104 High-Level Panel Report, supra note 77, para. 208. See generally id., paras. 198-208.
106 Summit Outcome Document, supra note 78.


114 Id. paras. 13-27.

115 Id. paras. 28-48.

116 Id. paras. 67-71.

117 Id., Early Warning and Assessment, annex.

118 Id. annex, para. 7.

119 Id. para. 3.


122 Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, supra note 113, para. 10(c).


124 Id.

125 Id.

126 Id.

127 Id.


130 July 24 Debate, supra note 128, at 1.

131 July 28 Debate, supra note 128, at 1.


133 Id. at 11.

134 July 28 Debate, supra note 128, at 1.

135 Id. at 6-7.

136 Supra note 110.


139 Independent Inquiry Report, supra note 1.
140 Srebrenica Report, supra note 79.
141 Early Warning Report, supra note 138, para. 7.
142 Id. paras. 8, 9.
143 Id. para. 10.
144 Id. paras. 11-12.
145 Id. paras. 15-17.
146 Id. para. 14.
147 GA 2010 Dialogue, supra note 137.
148 For a report on the negotiations and vote in the Fifth Committee, see Global Center for the Responsibility to Protect, ACABQ and Fifth Committee Negotiations on the Joint Office, January 2011, available at www.globalr2p.org. Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela were the major opponents.
150 Id. para. 40.
151 Id. para. 42.
153 Id.
154 Id.
157 Id. preamble.
158 Id.
159 Id. op. para. 2a.
160 Id. paras. 4-8.
161 Id. paras. 15-16; annex 1.
162 Id. paras. 17-21; annex 2.
163 Id. paras. 24-25.
164 Id. para. 26.
166 Id. op. para. 4.
167 Id. paras. 6-12.
168 Id. paras. 13-16.
169 Id. paras. 17-18; annex 1.
170 Id. paras. 19-21; annex 2.
172 In paragraph 11 of the resolution, the Human Rights Council requested the Commission to investigate alleged violations of international human rights law in Libya, to establish the facts and circumstances and the crimes perpetrated, and to identify those responsible to ensure accountability of responsible individuals.
175 Id. at 1.
176 Id.
Id.


Sixty-five years after the Nuremberg Trials of Nazi war criminals, its successor tribunals . . . are sending a clear message to brutal dictators that they will be held accountable. The international community now has formally acknowledged the sovereign’s primary responsibility to protect its people and will continue to act, as have NATO and the ICC, to enforce this responsibility as a last resort.”

179 ICC Arrest Warrants, supra note 178.


186 Id. op. para. 6.

187 Id. para. 12.


189 See e.g. Gregg Carlstrom, Responsibility to protect or right to meddle? The Libya no-fly zone is either a humanitarian mission or an excuse to meddle, depending on who you ask?, ALJAZEERA.NET, March 24, 2011, available at www.english.aljazeera.net.

190 David Rieff, Saints Go Marching In, The National Interest, at 6, 14, July/Aug. 2011 [hereinafter Saints Go Marching In].

191 See Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, supra note 113.

192 U.N. Charter art. 33. See also id. arts. 34 and 36, which describe the pertinent measures for the Security Council’s use.

193 Id. arts. 39-41.

194 Id. art. 52.

195 See supra notes 115-116 and accompanying text.

196 Saints Go Marching In, supra note 190, at 11-13.

197 See Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, supra note 113, at 15-22.

198 Saints Go Marching In, supra note 190, at 11.


Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, supra note 113, at 24.  

See supra sec. IV.

Because of the urgency to take military action, since Khadafi’s forces were knocking at the gates of Benghazi, the Security Council action was appropriate. But David Rieff suggests that the Libyan case illustrates the ease of using R2P to justify military intervention. Saints Go Marching In, supra note 190.

This is how Rieff characterizes it. Id. at 15. See also Fabrice Weissman, Not In Our Name: Why MSF [Medecins Sans Frontieres] Does Not Support the “Responsibility to Protect,” Oct. 4, 2010, at 2: “R2P is most controversial as a theory of ‘just war’ -- that is, as a rationale for warfare rather than, say, an appeal to states to use diplomatic means to contain violence against civilians.” Available at https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/article_print.cfm?id=4778. Weissman adds that, in addition to operational constraints on Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières for not supporting R2P, “there is a more philosophical reason for refusing the call to arms: if the purpose of humanitarian action is to limit the devastation of war, it cannot be used as a justification for new wars.” Id. at 5.

R2P -- Five Years On, supra note 199 at 158.  

Id.  

Id.  

Id. at 160.


Supra note 114.  

Supra note 129.  

Independent Inquiry Report, supra note 1.  

Srebrenica Report, supra note 79.  

Early Warning Report, supra note 138.  

For the report on the General Assembly’s Interactive Dialogue see supra note 137.  

Early Warning Report, supra note 138, para. 19.  

Id. para. 17.  

See supra note 148.  

Supra note 149.  

Id. para. 39.  

Id. para. 40.  

UN GA A/RES/63/308, supra note 110.  


For a detailed discussion see id. at 150-151.  

Id. at 151-152.  

See supra notes 199-200, and accompanying text.  

R2P -- Growing Pains, supra note 209.  

Summit Outcome Document, supra note 78, para. 139.  

High Level Panel Report, supra note 77, para. 207a-e.  

See generally R2P -- Five Years On, supra note 199, at 160-162.  

R2P -- Growing Pains, supra note 209, at 361-362.


Id.