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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

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MATRIX INITIATIVES, INC., ET AL., :

Petitioners :

v. : No. 09-1156

JAMES SIRACUSANO, ET AL. :

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Washington, D.C.

Monday, January 10, 2011

The above-entitled matter came on for oral argument before the Supreme Court of the United States at 10:00 a.m.

APPEARANCES:

JONATHAN HACKER, ESQ., Washington, D.C.; on behalf of Petitioners.

DAVID C. FREDERICK, ESQ., Washington, D.C.; on behalf of Respondents.

PRATIK A. SHAH, ESQ., Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting Respondents.

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P R O C E E D I N G S

(10:00 a.m.)

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We will hear argument first this morning in Case 09-1156, Matrixx Initiatives v. James Siracusano.

Mr. Hacker.

ORAL ARGUMENT OF JONATHAN HACKER

ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS

MR. HACKER: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court:

All drug companies receive on an almost daily basis anecdotal hearsay reports about alleged adverse health events following the use of their products. Those incident reports do not themselves establish any reliable facts about the drug's performance or its safety, especially where, as here, there are only a handful of reports out of millions of products sold over a 4-year period, and --

JUSTICE GINSBURG: Mr. Hacker, do we know that from this record? I mean, we know that the plaintiffs were able to identify -- there's some dispute whether it's 12 or 23, but do you represent that there were no other complaints made? So that, let's say, there has been discovery; now we're just at the pleading stage. The company would have said: That's it, we

1 didn't have any more?

2 MR. HACKER: All I can speak for is what's
3 alleged in the complaint, and the complaint, no matter
4 how read, doesn't allege any more than 23 adverse event
5 reports.

6 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But they might have been
7 able through discovery to find that there were many
8 more.

9 MR. HACKER: That's true, but there's no
10 allegation that what they -- what they know about or
11 what they could find would have been a statistically
12 significant difference between the rate of reported
13 events and the background of --

14 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But why shouldn't that
15 determination be deferred until there's discovery, and
16 then we can know how many reports there really were?

17 MR. HACKER: Because it's incumbent on a
18 plaintiff to come to court with a case, to plead the
19 facts necessary to establish all of the elements of a
20 claim. And a securities fraud claim, of course,
21 requires both materiality and scienter, and neither of
22 those is established unless the company has knowledge of
23 facts establishing a reliable basis for inferring that
24 the drug itself is the cause of the reported event.

25 Absent information like that, there is

1 neither materiality nor scienter under the securities
2 laws, because neither the company nor an investor --
3 until there's reliable evidence of a causal link between
4 the two products, neither a company -- excuse me, a link
5 between the product and the event -- neither the company
6 nor investor would have any reason to think that an
7 adverse event report is -- actually indicates a problem
8 with the product, as opposed to a coincidence.

9 JUSTICE ALITO: Can there be some situations
10 in which statistically significant evidence would not be
11 necessary?

12 For example, suppose some very distinguished
13 physicians concluded based on clinical trials that there
14 was a connection between a drug and a very serious side
15 effect. Could that establish materiality?

16 MR. HACKER: I think a distinguished
17 physician would not conclude that there's a connection
18 unless the clinical trials reveal a statistically
19 significant difference between what they've seen and
20 what they would expect to see were there no association.
21 So there's that point, Your Honor.

22 But the second point I would make is, we
23 acknowledge there are a very narrow, limited number of
24 circumstances under which a claim can be pled absent
25 statistically significant evidence, but that's -- that's

1 because doctors and researchers will conclude that there
2 may be causation under narrow circumstances. For
3 example, I think the most common set of criteria are the
4 Bradford-Hill criteria. But nothing like that is pled
5 here, Your Honor.

6 JUSTICE SCALIA: Mr. Hacker, the complaint
7 did not rely exclusively upon these adverse incidents
8 but also referred to a study, a report by researchers at
9 the American Rhinologic Society --

10 MR. HACKER: Yes.

11 JUSTICE SCALIA: -- which -- which asserted
12 that there was a connection. So the -- is the question
13 before us simply whether in isolation the adverse
14 incidents would be enough, or is not the question
15 whether those adverse incidents placed next to this
16 study would be enough?

17 MR. HACKER: Well, two points, Your Honor.
18 First, the plaintiffs have throughout this litigation
19 framed their case as one based on the failure to
20 disclose adverse event reports. It's the number of
21 adverse event reports that they say is the problem, and
22 they're not saying that there was a study out there and
23 that we failed to disclose the study. But they say it's
24 the fact of the adverse event reports.

25 JUSTICE SCALIA: Why didn't they say that?

1 MR. HACKER: Well, I think if you look at
2 the -- to be clear, the study is not attached to the
3 complaint, so there wasn't a basis in the complaint for
4 saying the company was aware of a reliable study and
5 here are the details of the study and they failed to
6 disclose it.

7 JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, I thought the --
8 you're saying the complaint did not refer to the study?

9 MR. HACKER: It did refer to it. That's
10 true. And if you look at the study, there's really
11 nothing there. It's based on, primarily on a case study
12 of one -- and again, this isn't in the complaint. It is
13 attached to the red brief, Your Honor.

14 There's one case study of one man who is 55
15 year old -- 55 years old, which is the population most
16 likely to experience anosmia. You're more likely to get
17 it when you're -- he's suffering from signs of lupus.
18 Which causes anosmia, and he is taking Flonase, which
19 also causes anosmia. And so the idea that you can infer
20 from that one incident out of millions over years of
21 product sales that -- that Zicam causes anosmia under
22 the --

23 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: You're talking about
24 -- you're talking about who is right or wrong about the
25 connection between Matrixx and anosmia. But that's not

1 the question. I'm an investor in Matrixx; I worry
2 whether my stock price is going to go down. You can
3 have some psychic come out and say "Zicam is going to
4 cause a disease" with no support whatsoever, but if it
5 causes the stock to go down 20 percent, it seems to me
6 that's material.

7 MR. HACKER: That's precisely the point,
8 Your Honor. If a psychic came out or a lunatic on the
9 street corner is barking, you know, through a megaphone
10 that there's a problem with the product, that's not the
11 kind of information to rely -- a real investor would
12 rely on.

13 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But wait a minute.
14 These weren't psychics. These were 3 clinical doctors
15 in this area, one of them you knew poised to go to a
16 society meeting to make this allegation.

17 Doesn't it make a difference who the reports
18 are coming from and what the substance of those reports
19 may do to your product?

20 MR. HACKER: It may make a difference, Your
21 Honor, and I didn't mean to suggest that, you know,
22 these are psychics. The point simply is, following up
23 on the Chief Justice's question, that it does matter
24 what the basis of the allegation, and is the evidence,
25 the facts available to the company, reliable? Does it

1 create a reliable inference that a reasonable investor
2 would be concerned about?

3 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, suppose you
4 stipulate in response to the Chief Justice's question
5 that it is irrational, that it is probably baseless, but
6 that the market will react adversely. Is there a duty
7 then to address the claim?

8 MR. HACKER: Under the case law, it's not
9 clear that that's true. In this case, looking at this
10 case specifically, Your Honor, when the market reacted,
11 what the market was reacting to was a Good Morning
12 America report. It's very important to be clear about
13 what that report said.

14 On Good Morning America, a leading morning
15 news program, the allegation was made by Dr. Jafek that
16 Zicam causes anosmia. That's a very different
17 allegation that what the company was -- than what it was
18 the company was aware of, which was simply the adverse
19 event reports.

20 JUSTICE KENNEDY: But if there's a baseless
21 report and we stipulate that, although it's baseless,
22 it's going to affect the market, could that be the basis
23 for an allegation, assuming the requisite scienter, that
24 there's liability?

25 MR. HACKER: Two answers I would say, Your

1 Honor. First of all, we have to be very careful about
2 creating a rule through our interpretation of
3 materiality that would require companies in advance to
4 disclose the fact that a baseless, false allegation
5 about the company is going to come out because it
6 requires the company to ring the bell --

7 JUSTICE KENNEDY: But it's not the
8 allegation. It's the fact that the market may be
9 affected.

10 MR. HACKER: Well, I understand, but the
11 problem is it's the underlying -- what the rule would
12 say is, because the company is aware the market may be
13 affected, the company in advance has to say: A false
14 report about us is about to come out. It requires the
15 company to first ring the bell and then un-ring it in
16 the same statement, and that's not a good rule for
17 companies.

18 Shareholders wouldn't want that rule, to
19 require companies to denigrate their product and then do
20 their best to explain why the allegation is untrue.

21 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Mr. Hacker -- Mr. Hacker,
22 you just said, if I understood you correctly, that when
23 the -- when the news came out on Good Morning America,
24 accurate or not, there was an obligation to do something
25 about it, but among the -- the charges, it's not simply

1 that there was these reports, but it's the way the
2 company responded to them: Two press releases that said
3 allegations of any link of these drugs to anosmia are
4 completely unfounded. That statement was made even
5 after the -- what was it, Dr. Jafek?

6 MR. HACKER: Right.

7 JUSTICE GINSBURG: -- had this presentation,
8 and he was going to put Zicam's name on it and the
9 company said, you don't have any permission to do that.
10 So the company prevented Good Morning America from
11 happening earlier, and it made these affirmative
12 statements that there's no linkage.

13 MR. HACKER: Well, what they said was, and
14 this was true, that it was completely unfounded and
15 misleading. The very scientific panel that plaintiffs
16 themselves rely on, which convened and issued its report
17 2 weeks later, confirms that. There was no -- it's
18 absolutely unfounded at the time to --

19 JUSTICE GINSBURG: I thought that the
20 scientific report that came out later said, we can't say
21 one way or the other, as opposed to the company saying
22 that any suggestion of linkage is completely unfounded.

23 MR. HACKER: And that's correct, there
24 isn't. When -- when the scientific panel said you can't
25 make that claim, it's unfounded, there's no basis in the

1 available science.

2 JUSTICE GINSBURG: They didn't say
3 "unfounded." They said the evidence is not -- we can't
4 say yes and we can't say no. That's different from
5 completely unfounded.

6 MR. HACKER: Well, I'm -- with respect, Your
7 Honor, I'm not entirely sure it is. When you're talking
8 about science, you make a claim that's either supported
9 in the science or it's without support, and the point
10 the scientific panel was making is there was no support
11 in the available science, and what Jafek was relying on
12 was unreliable. As I just described, the one --

13 JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, Mr. Hacker, you were
14 saying that the question of whether there is support is
15 reducible to the question of whether there are
16 statistically significant findings. Now, as I
17 understand it, the FDA takes action all the time as to
18 drugs -- they force the withdrawal of a drug from the
19 market, they force relabeling of a drug -- on the basis
20 of findings that are not statistically significant.
21 Now, clearly in those cases the market has a right to
22 know the very things that are going to make the FDA take
23 action against a product and that are going to severely
24 affect the product's value to the company. Not
25 statistical significance there.

1 MR. HACKER: That's true, but the problem
2 with that sort of standard -- well, first of all, to
3 emphasize, to look at the facts of this case, the FDA
4 didn't take any action until 5 years later, but -- which
5 shows --

6 JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, it could and
7 eventually it did.

8 MR. HACKER: But that's --

9 JUSTICE KAGAN: And you are suggesting a
10 test for what -- what counts as material, which is
11 statistically significant, a test that the FDA itself
12 doesn't use when it thinks about what it should what it
13 should regulate.

14 MR. HACKER: The problem is ex ante. You
15 have to -- you can't look at this through hindsight.
16 You have to look at it ex ante. When a company has a
17 handful of reports, it's absolutely true, nobody would
18 dispute, that some day in the future, with the
19 accumulation of more data, the FDA may take action based
20 on its own prophylactic public regulatory discretion.
21 But at the time, ex ante, no condition when it gets an
22 adverse event report can possibly know whether that's
23 enough information for the FDA to act. So the prospect
24 that the FDA may some day act on the basis of
25 additionally accumulated information would require

1 disclosure of all reports all the time, and that we
2 submit cannot be the standard.

3 JUSTICE SCALIA: Mr. Hacker, suppose Good
4 Morning America made the same claim, categorically
5 saying that this drug caused this condition, but did so
6 simply on the basis of these adverse incidents, and they
7 didn't have Dr. Jafek's, or whatever his name is,
8 reports, but nonetheless Good Morning America comes out
9 on the basis of those incidents saying Zicam causes
10 whatever the condition is. Would that have to be
11 reported? And if not, why not?

12 MR. HACKER: I think what you would have to
13 be hypothesizing is evidence that the company, say a
14 week in advance, knew that Good Morning America was
15 going to come out and say that. Because once Good
16 Morning America says it, it's said it and the effect is
17 what it is. But even in the hypothetical, you'd have to
18 sort of unpack what you said. If Good Morning America
19 came out and said just what Matrixx knew at the time,
20 there are a handful of adverse event reports, it's over
21 millions of product uses over a 4-year period, and no
22 indication that that's at all in any way different from
23 the incident rate in the general population, especially
24 among cold users, who of course are most likely to
25 experience anosmia, we don't know what would have

1 happened. But then you add the element that Good
2 Morning America then declares that Zicam causes anosmia
3 -- again, the hypothetical would have to be in advance
4 Matrixx is aware that the false claim is going to be
5 made.

6 JUSTICE SCALIA: Fine.

7 MR. HACKER: Right, and I would say, first
8 of all, we have to be very careful, as I said before,
9 about a rule that requires a company to disclose false
10 facts. I would say, second, that a reasonable investor
11 doesn't want false information; a reasonable investor
12 wants accurate information. And a reasonable investor
13 would actually --

14 JUSTICE SCALIA: These are unreasonable
15 investors who are relying on some talking head on Good
16 Morning America who says that this is true, even though
17 it isn't true.

18 MR. HACKER: That's the third point I would
19 make, Your Honor, is it's a different case, a
20 fundamentally different case, if you're talking about a
21 media --

22 JUSTICE SCALIA: You've neither answered yes
23 or no. There's no basis for its being said on Good
24 Morning America, but unreasonable investors by the
25 thousands rely upon it.

1 MR. HACKER: And I think the answer is no.
2 I think the reason it's no, a qualified no, is because
3 --

4 JUSTICE SCALIA: No --

5 MR. HACKER: -- the law doesn't respond to
6 irrational, unpredictable, or unreasonable investors.
7 It responds to a reasonable investor who wants
8 accurate -- a reasonable investor is going to hold the
9 stock.

10 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: A reasonable
11 investor is going to worry about the fact that thousands
12 of unreasonable investors are going to dump their
13 Matrixx stock.

14 MR. HACKER: I absolutely understand that.

15 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I mean, there's
16 nothing unreasonable about that. If it looks -- if
17 you're looking at Good Morning America, you say, my
18 gosh, everybody else is going to sell this; I'm going to
19 sell, too. And if it turns out you knew about it you
20 should have told me about it before.

21 MR. HACKER: The point I would make is,
22 first of all, a company ex ante can't know when that's
23 going to happen. So all the hypotheticals are
24 suggesting some way of knowing the company --

25 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: It may not know, but

1 it certainly can know. If you know this is a very false
2 report, but we know that, I don't know, the surgeon
3 general, somebody, is going to come out and announce it
4 and that will cause an effect --

5 MR. HACKER: That's why it's a meaningfully
6 different case. If the plaintiffs had plead in their
7 complaint that there's a memo inside the company, for
8 example, so this false fact is going to come out, and we
9 know it's going to cause a stock drop, that would be a
10 case involving the materiality of a media splash, a big
11 media event.

12 It can't be that there's a false claim out
13 there somewhere and the company becomes aware of the
14 false claim and then purely hypothetically it's possible
15 that somebody will make the false claim. It becomes
16 also possible that the media will pick up and not be
17 persuaded to ignore the false claim. That's the kind of
18 case we're talking about here.

19 JUSTICE KAGAN: In most cases we don't know
20 whether the claim is false or not. So let me give you a
21 hypothetical. There's a pharmaceutical company and it
22 comes out with its first and only product, it's 100
23 percent of the sales, and it's a new contact lens
24 solution. And it sells this product to many, many, many
25 hundreds of thousands of people. And most of them use

1 this product with no adverse effect whatsoever, but
2 there are ten cases where somebody uses this product and
3 they go blind. Three of those ten cases, the person had
4 to borrow a contact lens from a friend, only used it in
5 one eye, they go blind only in that one eye.

6 This is not statistically significant.
7 There is no way that anybody would tell that you these
8 ten cases are statistically significant. Would you stop
9 using that product and would a reasonable investor want
10 to know about those ten cases?

11 MR. HACKER: I would want to know more about
12 the number of uses and all that, but, no, there wouldn't
13 be a basis. A reasonable investor would want to know
14 all the facts and details that would establish a reason
15 to draw a --

16 JUSTICE KAGAN: There are a lot of contact
17 lens solutions in the world. So if I heard that, ten
18 people went blind, three used it in one eye, three went
19 blind in that eye, I'd stop using the product; and if I
20 were holding stock in that company, I would sell the
21 stock.

22 MR. HACKER: The problem is, there has to be
23 some reliable basis. You may be describing facts that
24 would satisfy the Bradford Hill criteria, for example,
25 where you can draw a reliable inference that the product

1 is the cause. That's the key here. There has to be a
2 reliable basis for inferring causation.

3 JUSTICE BREYER: This is the same kind of
4 question, but suppose I don't really know how drug
5 companies operate. I suspect, but I don't know, that
6 where you have a serious drug, people are hurt all the
7 time and they blame the drug. So probably drug
8 companies operate in an environment where they get all
9 kinds of complaints and some are valid, some are not;
10 who knows? People are frightened.

11 MR. HACKER: Very much so.

12 JUSTICE BREYER: Okay. Now, I don't know
13 that. But you say at the beginning your client says:
14 Look, we get complaints all the time; you know, just put
15 up with it if you buy our stock. Now, I don't know to
16 what extent that's true. I don't know how that fits in.
17 I don't know whether their complaint is unusual or not
18 unusual or general.

19 Who is supposed to decide that? The judge
20 at the complaint stage? Or the judge after you get some
21 evidence on it? Or the jury? And the same is true of
22 scienter, after all, because the scienter -- and you
23 have to plead that with particularity. Okay. What's
24 your answer? What's -- I mean, Justice Kagan had an
25 interesting view of this, and it could be that she's

1 putting forward and others might have a different view.
2 Who is to decide this?

3 MR. HACKER: Well, ultimately it's a
4 question -- it would go all the way to the jury if the
5 plaintiffs were able to plead facts in the complaint
6 that entitled them to --

7 JUSTICE BREYER: Well, we don't know. You
8 see, what they're saying is we have one respectable
9 doctor, studier, at, you know, in Colorado. He, by the
10 way has an abstract, which isn't in the complaint, which
11 says that they do allege that it's zinc that's the
12 problem, a free zinc ion. And they say we also have 25
13 people who were hurt and some burning sensations in
14 people that didn't rise to that level.

15 You know, I don't know. I don't know if
16 that's within the range of expectation of drug companies
17 as part of the normal course of business which investors
18 should know about, and I suspect a district judge
19 doesn't know, either. So how does it work where we in
20 fact just don't know whether this does or not arise
21 above the background noise of a drug company?

22 MR. HACKER: We think the answer is
23 statistical significance, just like the Second Circuit
24 said in Carter-Wallace --

25 JUSTICE BREYER: Oh, no, it can't be. I'm

1 sorry, I don't mean to take a position yet. But, look,
2 Albert Einstein had the theory of relativity without any
3 empirical evidence, okay? So we could get the greatest
4 doctor in the world and he has dozens of theories, and
5 the theories are very sound and all that fits in here is
6 an allegation he now has learned that it's the free zinc
7 ion that counts. And that could be devastating to a
8 drug even though there isn't one person yet who has been
9 hurt. So I can't see how we can say this statistical
10 evidence always works or always doesn't work.

11 MR. HACKER: But, Your Honor, out of
12 millions of uses, if there was that problem, it wouldn't
13 be hard to plead a case that says there is a significant
14 problem --

15 JUSTICE BREYER: They did. They said --
16 they said the free zinc ion was -- that word on this was
17 told to your client by a person who knows a lot about
18 it, is apparently reputable, and was told to a person
19 who also knows a lot about it. I think they're saying
20 you ought to have been very nervous at that point. That
21 isn't just the usual background noise, okay? So I'm
22 back to my question, which is -- you can answer the
23 other one too if you like. But my question is: Who is
24 supposed to decide, how?

25 MR. HACKER: Well, I think a plaintiff -- I

1 mean, I may just be repeating myself, but a plaintiff
2 has to plead the facts that would entitle them to relief
3 at the end of the day. So, I'm not saying a judge --

4 JUSTICE BREYER: I know, and we are back to
5 my question --

6 MR. HACKER: And --

7 JUSTICE BREYER: The question is, the facts
8 that are pleaded is -- I think it's assumed that this is
9 above the normal background noise; they certainly argue
10 that at length -- that there was this free zinc ion
11 conversation, that there are 25 people who were hurt,
12 and there is a lot of burning sensation going on, even
13 though it doesn't rise to the level of people being
14 hurt, and that's supported by some of the zinc sulfate
15 studies in the fish --

16 MR. HACKER: I think you need to --

17 JUSTICE BREYER: -- okay? Now, they're
18 saying that's above the background noise and you say,
19 no, it isn't. Now, who decides and how do we decide?
20 Don't we have to go to a trial?

21 MR. HACKER: The answer is no, Your Honor,
22 because there is no basis on those pleaded facts for
23 inferring that there's actually a problem with the zinc
24 ion --

25 JUSTICE BREYER: I know. I know, but

1 over --

2 MR. HACKER: -- but look at the allegations
3 --

4 JUSTICE BREYER: We're not saying -- you're
5 saying if you are a scientist -- now we're back to
6 Justice Scalia's questions and the --

7 MR. HACKER: But it matters what a scientist
8 would think because it's only then that anybody ex ante,
9 again, remember --

10 JUSTICE BREYER: Well, then what --

11 MR. HACKER: -- has a basis for inferring
12 that there is a causal link which would be the problem,
13 and the zinc -- to be very clear, to be very clear about
14 the zinc studies, the claim made on the telephone wasn't
15 even a claim of causation. It said, are you aware of
16 the zinc sulfate studies, which of course is a
17 fundamentally different compound than --

18 JUSTICE BREYER: No, because the sulfate --
19 you see in the abstract, which they didn't put in the
20 complaint, that the problem that they saw arising out of
21 the zinc sulfate studies was the free zinc ion.

22 MR. HACKER: No, the zinc sulfate studies
23 were -- totally irrelevant. What they cited for the
24 free zinc ions were studies of catfish and turtles. And
25 nobody thinks, nobody thinks, that you can infer

1 anything from a study of catfish and turtles about their
2 smell sensation and human beings.

3 JUSTICE BREYER: The trouble is, you know,
4 the truth is I don't know, and so I'm back to my
5 question.

6 MR. HACKER: Well, in terms of scienter,
7 under the securities law there has to be a plausible
8 basis --

9 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Counsel, you got cert
10 granted on a limited question, and the limited question
11 was whether in a complaint that alleges only adverse
12 reports can you prove materiality and scienter without
13 proving statistical importance. That's the question
14 presented.

15 Justice Kagan started with the point that
16 the FDA doesn't require that. It requires just
17 reasonable evidence of a connection, not statistical.
18 Many of the amici here have done a wonderful job of
19 explaining why statistical importance can't be a measure
20 because it depends on the nature of the study at issue.

21 So given all of that -- and even in your
22 brief, in a footnote, you answered the question by
23 saying, no, we can't establish that rule as an absolute,
24 because there are additional factors that could prove
25 materiality and scienter. So you've already answered

1 the question presented.

2 Are we down to what Justice Scalia asked
3 you, which is: We got a no to the question: Are the
4 facts in this case enough? I don't know why we would
5 have granted cert on that, but you presented a different
6 question presented. Given the question presented, is
7 the answer no? And if not, why not?

8 MR. HACKER: Let me -- let me start with the
9 premise of the question presented. It's presented on
10 the facts as the case has been litigated today, trying
11 to rely on adverse event reports, which is
12 understandable. The plaintiffs don't want to have to
13 prove all of the other -- you wouldn't think they would
14 want to prove all the other facts.

15 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Can I just interrupt a
16 second?

17 MR. HACKER: Sure.

18 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: This wasn't an FDA-
19 approved drug.

20 MR. HACKER: Right.

21 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So there weren't any
22 adverse reports in the legal sense of that word.

23 MR. HACKER: In the FDA sense, that's true.

24 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: In the FDA sense. So
25 we're using a misnomer here to start with.

1 MR. HACKER: Well --

2 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Continue.

3 MR. HACKER: I would just say that adverse
4 event reports are not limited to what qualifies for the
5 FDA, certainly not by the way the case is --

6 JUSTICE SCALIA: Of course, if I may
7 interject --

8 MR. HACKER: -- litigated.

9 JUSTICE SCALIA: -- the FDA acts in the
10 public interest, doesn't it?

11 MR. HACKER: Yes.

12 JUSTICE SCALIA: And it doesn't make money
13 by withdrawing a drug from the market?

14 MR. HACKER: Yes.

15 JUSTICE SCALIA: As opposed to somebody who
16 sues, who makes money on the lawsuit?

17 MR. HACKER: That's true. But there's a
18 broader point about the FDA, which I think is underlying
19 your question and Justice Kagan's question, which is I
20 don't even think it's true that the FDA really requires
21 reasonable evidence. They have broad discretion and
22 should have broad discretion. Nobody is contesting
23 that. But the question is, again ex ante, before you
24 know what the FDA might do, before there's sufficient
25 evidence to justify the FDA to act. Remember, the FDA

1 didn't act for 5 years. The FDA didn't act on the basis
2 of what Matrixx was aware of at the time, and so, that
3 can't be the standard, the idea that the FDA may some
4 day act.

5 Statistical significance -- the question of
6 statistical significance is presented in this case to
7 the extent the courts below were arguing about and the
8 plaintiffs were arguing about whether or not the small
9 number of raw adverse event reports tell you anything
10 meaningful. The real standard -- the -- the case got
11 developed in the briefing here when the plaintiffs came
12 back and said, well, there's more to it and there can be
13 more to it, and that, of course, is true, but the
14 standard has to be reliability.

15 JUSTICE GINSBURG: You have said raw adverse
16 event reports. Am I not right that all of these reports
17 came from medical doctors, and in response to the very
18 first one, the company representative said, yeah, we've
19 been getting reports since 1999?

20 MR. HACKER: Well, there's a reference -- I
21 mean, there's a -- 1999 was the first call from
22 Dr. Hirsch, who reported one patient. There is a
23 discussion with Dr. Linschoten about one other patient.
24 And there were some reports -- nobody is disputing that
25 there were some reports out there.

1 JUSTICE GINSBURG: My question is, does it
2 make a difference if these reports come from medical
3 experts in this particular field?

4 MR. HACKER: No, because a doctor doesn't
5 have unique expertise in diagnosing causation. A
6 doctor -- if you have a sore knee, a doctor is qualified
7 to tell you -- to diagnose the fact that your sore knee
8 is the product of bone cancer. A doctor is not
9 qualified to tell you why you got bone cancer, and
10 that's the problem that we have here.

11 I would like to reserve the balance of my
12 time.

13 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you,
14 Mr. Hacker.

15 Mr. Frederick.

16 ORAL ARGUMENT OF DAVID C. FREDERICK

17 ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS

18 MR. FREDERICK: Thank you, Mr. Chief
19 Justice, and may it please the Court:

20 In TSC and Basic, this Court reaffirms the
21 longstanding rule that materiality is judged based on
22 the total mix of information available to investors.
23 Matrixx initially sought a major change to this Court's
24 contextual approach to materiality by offering a bright
25 line standard of statistical significance.

1 In its reply brief, Matrixx offer -- offers
2 a rule that would apply only in the hypothetical
3 scenario where investors rely solely on numbers of
4 adverse event reports in pleading securities fraud.

5 This Court should reject both arguments in
6 this case. The broad theory has numerous legal and
7 policy flaws. First, the longstanding totality of the
8 circumstances test best comports with the varied reasons
9 why investors make investment decisions.

10 JUSTICE ALITO: Suppose the allegations of
11 materiality are based solely on adverse event reports?
12 Suppose that it's alleged that ten million people
13 during -- during -- during 1 year have taken a
14 particular drug and five people shortly after taking the
15 drug have developed certain -- have had an adverse --
16 have had -- experienced an adverse event. Is that
17 sufficient to go to a jury?

18 MR. FREDERICK: Well, probably not
19 sufficient to go a jury absent a drop in the stock
20 price, absent evidence that there was a scientifically
21 plausible link, absent evidence that the product was
22 highly important to the company's long-term financial
23 prospects. All of these things go into the contextual
24 mix that investors would regard as important in making
25 an investment decision, and they all happen to be

1 present here. We --

2 JUSTICE SCALIA: If it was the only product,
3 they sold that might be enough, five adverse reports out
4 of ten million? If -- if that's the only product they
5 make, you say, totality of the circumstances, that may
6 be enough?

7 MR. FREDERICK: Under the Basic test, Your
8 Honor, that very well might if the probability and the
9 magnitude of the harm -- if those five incidents were
10 deaths from a product that was easily substitutable,
11 that might be a relevant decision and information that
12 investors might want to take into account.

13 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: In response to
14 Justice Alito, I heard you say something about a
15 scientifically plausible link?

16 MR. FREDERICK: Correct.

17 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: That seems to me to
18 be a rather significant concession. In other words,
19 you're saying it's not simply the fact that some psychic
20 would say something, that that is not sufficient, even
21 if that has an impact on the market price, that there
22 has to be some scientifically plausible link to the
23 report?

24 MR. FREDERICK: I think this goes back to
25 Justice Kennedy's question as well, Mr. Chief Justice,

1 because there could very well be materiality. The
2 information might be important for investors, but it
3 could very well be that the people making the
4 disclosures don't have the requisite scienter because
5 there is an absence of any plausible relationship.

6 The stock price might drop on news that
7 would not be regarded as news that the most highly
8 scientifically rational people would take into account.

9 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, I thought this might
10 come up. At some point do we look at scienter and then
11 go back from that to whether or not it's material, i.e.,
12 the argument would be the company knew that this would
13 affect the price, and that's why they didn't disclose it
14 and therefore that shows it's material? Or do we do
15 this with two isolated boxes: one, materiality, two,
16 scienter, and we don't mix the analyses.

17 MR. FREDERICK: They're both analytically
18 distinct and related, Justice Kennedy, and I don't have
19 a simple answer for you because many of the recorded
20 cases raise issues of both materiality and scienter.
21 What the Court has said in Basic is that the test is the
22 total mix of information and whether that -- under that
23 total mix the investor would find that information
24 important. In Tellabs the Court said that whether or
25 not the inferences of scienter could be deemed as

1 plausible as other inferences based on the mental state
2 of the people making the information.

3 So the Court has announced separate tests.
4 In a case like this there is a natural overlap, and in
5 fact the other side has litigated this case on the basis
6 that no one would have thought within the company, based
7 on the adverse event reports, that there was a basis for
8 thinking there was information.

9 We plead the other way by saying that when
10 you have three medical specialists in three distinct
11 periods where the last wants to bring findings to the
12 leading ear, nose and throat medical society suggesting
13 that, based on studies that go back as far back as the
14 1930s, there is a scientifically plausible link based on
15 the zinc ions, that's something that the company should
16 have taken seriously and disclosed to investors.

17 JUSTICE KAGAN: But Mr. Frederick, suppose
18 you are the CEO of a pharmaceutical company with a new
19 drug, you've just put it back on the market, and you get
20 a report back, this drug has caused a death, right?
21 This is your first adverse effect report. Do you have
22 to disclose it?

23 MR. FREDERICK: Well, I guess the first
24 thing I would say is if the drug has not been FDA
25 approved, that would be material information that

1 investors might want to know. If the drug had been FDA
2 approved and that report was then submitted to the FDA,
3 I think that there's a closer call depending on the, you
4 know, effect of the report that might be on the stock
5 price, because that's the only company product and the
6 other factors that we've mentioned in our brief.

7 I think the question of one event is
8 obviously much more difficult than where there are
9 multiple events submitted by doctors with a
10 scientifically plausible basis on a product that's 70
11 percent of the company's revenues.

12 JUSTICE ALITO: Now we're told that there
13 are hundreds of thousands of these; for a -- for a
14 typical drug there may be thousands of these adverse
15 event reports in -- in a year, and you're -- basically
16 you're saying all of those have to be disclosed?

17 MR. FREDERICK: Justice Alito, they already
18 are all disclosed.

19 JUSTICE ALITO: Well they -- already. So
20 then why does the company have to make additional
21 disclosure?

22 MR. FREDERICK: The --

23 JUSTICE ALITO: Analysts who follow the
24 stock price can easily look at the FDA web site and see
25 the adverse event reports that have been reported --

1 MR. FREDERICK: Right.

2 JUSTICE ALITO: -- and draw whatever
3 conclusions seem to be warranted based on that.

4 MR. FREDERICK: That's why I think this
5 presents the issue in a rather artificial way, because
6 the reports here were not the classic FDA-regulated
7 adverse event reports. This was a homeopathic drug that
8 was put on the market without FDA approval, and there
9 were no requirements of reports until 2006 which was
10 after the -- at issue here.

11 JUSTICE BREYER: How would you write --
12 look, I'm asking how do you write this, because what --
13 where I think where the other side has a point, is if --
14 with these -- this is a big class of these kinds of
15 things, you know, vitamins, all kinds of things like
16 that -- and if we say that they have to disclose too
17 much, what will happen is people won't pay attention to
18 it, you know.

19 And if -- if you have, you know, 4,000 pages
20 of small print saying everything that was ever reported,
21 what really happens in -- in such instances is the
22 public pays no attention, and they think -- and it will
23 hide things that are actually important.

24 So how would you write some words --
25 assuming that you're right, that their test is wrong --

1 but how would you write some words that will put a
2 disclosure obligation such that it's not going to be
3 overkill and it is going to get incidents that rise
4 above the background noise, and those are the incidents
5 that are -- that would be significant for a reasonable
6 investor?

7 MR. FREDERICK: I would start with the
8 language in Basic which says the total mix of
9 information is what has long standing been the test for
10 materiality under this Court's cases. I would say that
11 where there is credible medical professionals describing
12 the harms based on credible scientific theories to back
13 up the link, a very serious health effect risk for
14 products with many substitutes, and the effect is on a
15 predominant product line, then the company ought to
16 disclose that information. I will not --

17 JUSTICE BREYER: Okay, I'll go back and read
18 what you've just said, and -- I will, because it will be
19 in the transcript, and -- and the -- I -- this case, you
20 are very good, your clients, and the lawyers at writing
21 complaints.

22 MR. FREDERICK: Right.

23 JUSTICE BREYER: All right? So they've
24 alleged in this complaint everything they can show, and
25 I -- I suspect -- and during the class period. And what

1 it doesn't say is that very helpful chart that you put
2 in the brief, in the pocket. It doesn't say they ever
3 showed that to the company. All it says is there was a
4 phone call and this individual from -- from Colorado
5 said something, which it doesn't specify, about zinc and
6 the -- and the number of deaths.

7 MR. FREDERICK: Well, in 1999, though,
8 Justice Breyer, Dr. Hirsch, and this is outlined at
9 paragraph 25 of the complaint, also said that intranasal
10 application of zinc could be problematic, and he
11 specifically asked about how much zinc is put in Zicam
12 precisely because of his awareness of prior studies
13 going all the way back to the polio period in which zinc
14 had created a problem of persistent anosmia. But our
15 submission here is that --

16 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: How was your -- that
17 long litany of factors you mentioned a few moments ago
18 about how a company will go about determining whether an
19 adverse event report is material or not or should be
20 disclosed or not, are you saying that companies don't
21 have to respond to a rational securities holders? Are
22 you accepting your adversary's proposition that on some
23 level -- you said credible evidence -- that they don't
24 have to respond to things they judge are not credible?

25 MR. FREDERICK: It really depends, Justice

1 Sotomayor, and I don't mean to be evasive, but if there
2 is a product, say, that has some link to satanic
3 influences, and there is some reason to think that a
4 large body of followers in an irrational way might
5 regard there to be satanic influences on the basis of a
6 particular product, a cautious, reasonably prudent
7 investor might want to know that on the basis of that
8 information that most of us would regard as irrational,
9 might affect the stock price.

10 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So what protection
11 is there at the summary judgment stage in response to
12 allegations? Because it doesn't have to be
13 scientifically valid; it can be completely irrational.
14 All you have to do is allege that, you know, if you had
15 told this the price would have gone down. If you had
16 disclosed this the price would have gone down, and the
17 response from the company is, well, but this is just
18 ridiculous. This is some guy in his garage who writes
19 this out on -- on a -- you know, a piece of paper in --
20 in handwriting; and the response is going to be, well
21 let's let the jury sort it out.

22 MR. FREDERICK: There are two answers, Mr.
23 Chief Justice. One is in Basic itself, the Court talked
24 about the actions of a reasonable investor, and this
25 Court and many courts have always looked at a reasonable

1 person's standard in making all sorts of these fine
2 judgments about the importance of particular
3 information. But the second answer is --

4 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, you just told
5 me that it would be enough if somebody says that there's
6 a satanic, you know, impact on this, because a
7 reasonable investor would say there are enough crazy
8 people out there that this is going to affect the price.

9 MR. FREDERICK: What I said was if the
10 product was one that might be, you know, attractive in
11 some way to people who had that particular following. I
12 think you have to link up the product with the nature of
13 the complaint and the effect of the importance of the
14 information --

15 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So it matters
16 whether -- I don't know what kind of product has
17 particular satanic susceptibility --

18 (Laughter.)

19 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: -- but I mean, are
20 you saying it matters if it's something that -- that
21 Satan's not going to be interested in? I don't
22 understand.

23 (Laughter.)

24 MR. FREDERICK: You're --

25 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I don't mean to be

1 facetious, but your way of distinguishing the satanic
2 product is that it depends on whether people who follow
3 satanic cults are going to be interested or not. I
4 mean --

5 MR. FREDERICK: Well, Your Honor, there are
6 people who follow those things, and they spend money and
7 they buy stocks, but my second point is that scienter --
8 scienter is the other way around this problem. Because
9 even though information --

10 JUSTICE SCALIA: I don't know if scienter is
11 -- it seems to me ridiculous to -- to hold companies to
12 -- to irrational standards; and we did -- and we did say
13 in -- in Basic that it's viewed -- whether it would be
14 viewed by the reasonable investor. And -- and you are
15 saying well, the reasonable investor takes account of
16 the irrationality. I don't think that's what we meant
17 in -- in Basic.

18 MR. FREDERICK: Well, Justice Scalia, you
19 can certainly write as a prophylactic here that that
20 isn't part of -- the test. We certainly have here all
21 of the indicia of credible medical professionals on a
22 credible scientific theory on a product that was
23 important to the company's finances, and a very serious
24 side effect for a drug that had ready --

25 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So that -- I'm just

1 trying to get your response to that. You just talked
2 again about credible scientists and all that, and you're
3 putting those other things to one side.

4 So even if you have your satanic problem,
5 that is not enough. And you can sit there and allege it
6 would cause a drop of 30 percent in the stock price, and
7 you should have let this know. Your answer is no, they
8 don't have to let -- they don't have to disclose this
9 because there is no scientific credible basis for the
10 link that's alleged?

11 MR. FREDERICK: Now, I'm saying two things.
12 One is that there is a difference between scienter and
13 materiality. There is importance of information and an
14 intent to deceive, and the questions are analytically
15 distinct. In your hypothetical, Mr. Chief Justice, I
16 think you merged them, and I would like to keep them
17 separate because as we -- as this case comes to the
18 Court, the issue is what is the standard for materiality
19 and whether or not statistical significance is the only
20 way to --

21 JUSTICE ALITO: Can I give you -- because
22 I'm having a little difficulty understanding the
23 boundaries of the argument you're making.

24 Let me give 2 hypotheticals, and they both
25 involve companies that have one product, and this is

1 their one product. The first one was what I mentioned
2 before, and I wasn't -- I wasn't clear about your
3 answer. All that's alleged is that a very large number
4 of people took the drug and that three people, after
5 taking the drug, within a week developed a certain
6 syndrome. That's the first one. Is that enough for
7 materiality?

8 The second one is that a company receives a
9 telephone call: Hello, I'm a general practitioner from
10 wherever, and I treated a patient and the patient took
11 your medication and shortly after that developed this
12 syndrome, and I think there might be a connection. Is
13 that enough for materiality?

14 MR. FREDERICK: On the second one, I would
15 say probably not. And I would say on the first one,
16 there's not enough information about the side effect and
17 what the drug is intended to solve.

18 I mean, the probability magnitude test as
19 articulated by this Court goes to the probability of the
20 effect versus the magnitude that would be perceived by
21 investors, and those are important factors they go into.
22 So your hypothetical is very difficult to answer as you
23 have framed it.

24 JUSTICE ALITO: All right. This drug, let's
25 say it's a drug to relieve the common cold and the

1 effect is loss of the sense of smell. Five million
2 people take it. Three people, after taking it, lose
3 their sense of smell. Is that enough for materiality by
4 itself?

5 MR. FREDERICK: It -- by itself, that could
6 be enough, and the reason we know that could be enough,
7 Justice Alito, is that when, you know, some score
8 additional were released and this information was
9 disclosed, the stock price went down by 23.8 percent.

10 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Your time is running out,
11 and there is one thing you emphasize in your brief, and
12 I haven't heard you say one word about it here. And
13 that is: You're saying this is not a case of a company
14 that remains silent. The company, in response to this,
15 issued press releases in which it said any suggestion of
16 a linkage is completely unfounded. Now, that's
17 something different from, there are X number of reports.
18 To what extent are you relying on the affirmative
19 statements that the company made?

20 MR. FREDERICK: We're relying on those to
21 establish scienter, both at the beginning of the class
22 period when they forced Dr. Jafek, through their legal
23 threats, to take Zicam off his poster presentation, and
24 then later when they said that the reports of anosmia
25 were completely unfounded. And "misleading" was the

1 word that they used. "And misleading." And they
2 repeated that after the Good Morning America program
3 came on, only to say three weeks later, after empaneling
4 a scientific expert panel, that the information was
5 insufficient to make that determination. Our submission
6 is that that is enough.

7 JUSTICE SCALIA: Mr. Frederick, I'm -- I'm
8 not clear on why you can draw a distinction between
9 materiality and scienter for purposes of the issue
10 before us here.

11 If, indeed, satanic effect is enough for
12 materiality, you say, well, it may not be enough for
13 scienter. Why? I mean, if the company knows that
14 satanic effect is material, then the company has --
15 knowingly withholds it because it thinks satanic effect
16 is irrational, why doesn't that company have scienter,
17 if it's material?

18 The scienter is withholding something that
19 is material that is known to be material, and once you
20 say that -- you know, that Satan is material, if the
21 company thinks Satan is involved here, it has to put it
22 in its report, no?

23 MR. FREDERICK: And it would depend on what
24 kind of stock effect occurred.

25 JUSTICE SCALIA: So there's no difference

1 between the materiality issue and the scienter issue.

2 MR. FREDERICK: Well --

3 JUSTICE SCALIA: You can't push this problem
4 off onto the scienter side of the equation.

5 MR. FREDERICK: It depends -- it depends on
6 this Court's application of its known precedent, which
7 my colleague here has not even referenced in his opening
8 argument, Basic, which says you look at the total mix of
9 the information. And all of these things go into play.

10 JUSTICE BREYER: Okay. I get that. Can I
11 just ask you one question in response to -- just picking
12 up on the last, what about the need for a, quote,
13 "strong inference of scienter," end quote, and does this
14 complaint show more than a borderline situation where it
15 doesn't strongly infer that the person intended to
16 mislead the defendant? What about that argument?

17 MR. FREDERICK: Well, we believe, and they
18 haven't argued that this complaint is not sufficient
19 under the PSLRA, which set the heightened pleading
20 standard for scienter that this Court articulated and
21 construed in the Tellabs decision, so we believe that
22 scienter is adequately pleaded here based on --

23 JUSTICE BREYER: Well, page 49 of their
24 brief -- they have two pages on it -- it does not give
25 rise to a strong inference of scienter.

1 MR. FREDERICK: What I'm saying is that
2 there is already a heightened pleading standard, Justice
3 Breyer. I was not -- I misunderstood your question to
4 say, is there some other heightened pleading standard
5 other than the one --

6 JUSTICE BREYER: No, no, I mean -- I just
7 want to know why, if their inference on materiality is
8 enough to survive the background noise reply, is it
9 enough to show a strong inference that they did do this
10 intending to mislead, a strong inference of scienter?

11 MR. FREDERICK: The key aspects here are
12 their treatment of Jafek when Jafek was going to go
13 public with his scientifically linked claim of anosmia
14 from the Zicam, and then subsequently when they issued
15 press releases saying it would be completely unfounded
16 and misleading to assert any causal link. That is
17 sufficient to establish a strong inference of scienter.

18 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, Mr.
19 Frederick.

20 Mr. Shah.

21 ORAL ARGUMENT OF PRATIK A. SHAH
22 ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED STATES, AS AMICUS CURIAE,
23 SUPPORTING THE RESPONDENTS

24 MR. SHAH: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it
25 please the Court:

1 For 35 years, this Court's precedents have
2 instructed that information is material for securities
3 fraud purposes if a reasonable investor would have
4 viewed it as having meaningfully altered the total mix
5 of information. Under the terms of their question
6 presented, petitioners propose to depart from that
7 contextual inquiry in favor of a categorical rule that
8 deems information about an adverse drug effect
9 immaterial absent statistical significance.

10 JUSTICE SCALIA: Mr. Shah, what do you think
11 about Satan?

12 MR. SHAH: Let me try to unpack the satanic
13 connection hypotheticals a little bit.

14 Now, to be sure, if someone just called a
15 company and said, hey, I think you guys are affiliated
16 with satanic practices, surely a company would not have
17 to go and disclose that to all the investors. But this
18 is going to depend on what the actual reality is and
19 what the company's statements have been.

20 Now, if the company has made a statement
21 that, look, consumer confidence in our products is at an
22 all-time high and we expect sales to double in the next
23 quarter, and yet they are aware that there -- a consumer
24 boycott is being planned by, let's say, 10 percent of
25 their consumer base premised on the irrational notion

1 that their company is tied to Satan, then certainly to
2 correct their affirmative representation that consumer
3 confidence is at an all-time high and that they expect
4 their sales to double, a reasonable investor would want
5 to know --

6 JUSTICE SCALIA: They haven't said that.
7 They haven't said that our sales are going to double.
8 They're just walking along at normal sales.

9 MR. SHAH: Right.

10 JUSTICE SCALIA: And they find out that
11 10 percent of nutty-nuttys out there are not going to
12 buy their stuff because of Satan. What about that?

13 MR. SHAH: Your Honor, in that hypothetical,
14 it depends on what affirmative statements the companies
15 have made. Under the securities law -- and this is an
16 important point that I don't think has come through yet.
17 Under the securities laws, there is no baseline duty to
18 disclose for a manufacturer or a company. A company
19 creates a duty to disclose once they have spoken. So
20 it's going to depend on what the company has said.

21 Now, in your scenario, if a company has made
22 statements projecting their company's success into the
23 next quarter, for example, and they have a concrete
24 basis to know that, as your hypothetical submits,
25 10 percent of their computer -- consumer base is going

1 to leave the company's products, that is almost
2 certainly going to be material to an investor, and so
3 yes, they would have to disclose that we have reason to
4 believe, however ridiculous it is and untrue it is, that
5 10 percent of our consumer base has decided to boycott
6 our products. That's certainly reasonable.

7 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: You would have --
8 you just said they would have a duty to disclose?

9 MR. SHAH: Yes, sir.

10 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I thought you
11 earlier just said there's no affirmative duty to
12 disclose; it only is based on what they say?

13 MR. SHAH: It's based on what they said.
14 So, for example, if the company had simply remained
15 silent and not said anything about its future sales, its
16 prospects, then under the securities laws there is no
17 duty to disclose. Basic and other cases have long made
18 clear that there has to be something to trigger a duty
19 to disclose. That is, under Rule 10b-5 it's only
20 statements that are rendered misleading by the omission
21 of a material fact that can trigger liability. If there
22 is no projection about the company's future success,
23 then it wouldn't have to disclose in that situation.

24 JUSTICE ALITO: What if the company makes
25 the kind of relatively common statements that were made

1 here, poised for growth in the upcoming season, very
2 strong momentum going into the season, extremely well
3 positioned for successful season?

4 MR. SHAH: Sure, Your Honor --

5 JUSTICE ALITO: That -- that triggers the
6 duty to disclose the satanic rumors?

7 MR. SHAH: In certain cases where there are
8 very generalized statements, for example, we think our
9 product will do well, that may close -- come close to
10 the line of puffery that is a non- actionable statement
11 that no reasonable investor would rely on. Petitioners
12 have never pressed that argument before this Court.
13 There is no dispute about whether the statements that
14 Matrixx made in this case are actionable, even though I
15 agree with you that some of them probably come close to
16 that puffery line.

17 Here, though, we don't just have those
18 statements about the company being well positioned for
19 future growth. There are additional statements, and
20 these were made to stock analysts that they expected a
21 50 percent increase in annual revenues, and, of course,
22 there are the much more affirmative statements that the
23 drug's safety had been well-established and that the
24 reports of anosmia were completely unfounded and
25 misleading. Those statements certainly crossed the

1 line. And as I said before, there hasn't been an
2 argument in this case as to whether those less specific
3 and arguably puffery type statements --

4 JUSTICE SCALIA: So the government's
5 position is that reports of adverse effects that have no
6 scientific basis, so long as they would affect
7 irrationally consumers, have to be disclosed, assuming
8 the company has said we're doing well, right?

9 MR. SHAH: Well, Your Honor, yes, I think it
10 would depend, again, on the statements the company
11 makes. If -- if --

12 JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, I mean, if Satan
13 comes in, surely lousy science comes in as well, no?

14 MR. SHAH: Okay. So -- so, for example,
15 if -- if a company had been faced with potential adverse
16 effect and it had assembled its blue ribbon panel of
17 scientists, conclusively determined that there is no
18 causal connection between this purported adverse effect
19 and their drug, the question is, would they have to
20 disclose in that circumstance?

21 I think if the company had simply made
22 statements relating to the drug safety, we think our
23 drug is safe, there is no reason to believe that it
24 causes any adverse effects, then the answer is no,
25 because the reported adverse effect would not call into

1 question the accuracy of the company's statements
2 relating to the safety of the drug.

3 If, however, the company had made specific
4 statements relating to consumer demand for its products
5 and it knew, notwithstanding the fact that there was no
6 causal connection, it knew or had good reason to believe
7 that a significant portion of its consumer base would
8 avoid the product, then, yes, a reasonable investor
9 would want to know that information, and under Basic the
10 company would have a duty to disclose that, even though
11 unfounded, these reports may lead a significant
12 percentage of our consumer base to leave the product.

13 I think that falls squarely within the
14 definition of materiality, which is would a reasonable
15 investor want to have known that information?

16 JUSTICE KAGAN: Mr. Shah, what deference do
17 you think that the SEC's understanding of materiality
18 it's entitled to and why?

19 MR. SHAH: Well, Your Honor, this Court in
20 both TSC and Basic accorded what it called due deference
21 to the SEC's views on the application of the materiality
22 standard. I think it's certainly true -- and -- and
23 those, by the way, were both -- the -- the Court was
24 deferring to the views of the SEC as expressed in amicus
25 briefs to the Court just like in this case.

1 I think the SEC is due a significant
2 deference based on, one, its long-standing historical
3 practice in applying the materiality standard, which is
4 part of its own rule, Rule 10b-5, and its special
5 expertise in knowing what a reasonable investor would
6 want to know based upon its experience in this area.

7 So, I do think that to the extent there is
8 any ambiguity remaining in this case, the Court should
9 defer to the SEC's views. And back to Justice Breyer's
10 questions about what should the Court write simply
11 beyond reiterating the Basic standard, I think what the
12 Court did in Basic was it not only articulated the
13 general standard, but it laid out some factors. And in
14 laying out those factors, that's where the Court
15 deferred to the SEC's brief. And it laid out factors
16 that a reasonable investor might find relevant in that
17 case it was the merger context.

18 In here on page 28 of our brief, we lay out
19 several factors that we think bear on the materiality
20 question in this particular context; that is, involving
21 adverse drug information.

22 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Is there any way
23 that consideration of those factors would support a -- a
24 summary judgment in favor of the pharmaceutical
25 manufacturer, other than the fact of having an extremely

1 poor lawyer drafting a complaint? Anytime you have a
2 variety of factors like that --

3 MR. SHAH: Sure.

4 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: -- I think it's very
5 difficult for the judge to say anything other than
6 that's for the jury.

7 MR. SHAH: If you mean at the motion to
8 dismiss phase, Chief Justice?

9 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Yeah.

10 MR. SHAH: I think there would be some
11 cases. And in fact, we know there are dozens of
12 12(b)(6) motions granted in securities fraud cases, and
13 let me lay out a few scenarios for you.

14 One would be in the -- in the -- in the
15 scenario where the company has not made any actionable
16 statements. It has either -- statements predicated to
17 duty to disclose. It either has been made --

18 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: No, no, I'm talking
19 about the -- I'm talking about materiality. In other
20 words, based solely on -- in other words, you're saying
21 if they say anything related, it's going to be enough --

22 MR. SHAH: Sure.

23 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: -- whether it's a
24 scientific basis or not.

25 MR. SHAH: Sure. Two responses to that.

1 One, the PSLRA does have a safe harbor for companies
2 once they make forward-looking statements, that if they
3 add in meaningful cautionary language -- and this is in
4 the PSLRA itself, section 5(c)(1)(A), that if they add
5 in meaningful cautionary statements, then they cannot be
6 subject to liability. And I think there are a couple
7 other scenarios that would -- would trigger, for
8 example, if the product at issue is such a small
9 percentage of the company's income or expected growth
10 that no reasonable investor would care if it tanked,
11 then that might be a circumstance where a motion to
12 dismiss would be appropriate.

13 Thank you, Your Honor.

14 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.

15 Mr. Hacker, you have three minutes
16 remaining.

17 REBUTTAL ARGUMENT BY JONATHAN HACKER

18 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS

19 MR. HACKER: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.

20 I would like to return to Justice Kennedy's
21 question about the role of scienter here, which I think
22 absolutely is critical as this Court emphasized recently
23 in the Merck v. Reynolds case.

24 Mr. Frederick correctly, I think, conceded
25 that there has to be a scientifically plausible basis.

1 And what you're talking about here is the company's
2 knowledge of a scientifically plausible basis. And he
3 has to make that concession in this case because of what
4 is alleged to be the material omission.

5 The material omission is not knowledge of
6 dubious scientific -- medical claims, it's not that we
7 get one phone call from a doctor. The real material
8 omission is that the adverse event reports told Matrixx
9 that Zicam causes anosmia. That's ultimately the fact
10 that -- that Matrixx supposedly did not disclose. So
11 there has to be a basis for believing that -- there has
12 to be allegation in the complaint that sufficient to
13 establish Matrixx actually knew that Zicam causes
14 anosmia and yet willfully refused to tell investors that
15 fact, and there's nothing in the complaint like that.

16 There's not -- you're not talking about a
17 case where there was a failure to disclose the doctor's
18 completely dubious untested claim. It's not a case --
19 it's not the Satan case where you're talking about a
20 media splash, a known fact that there is going to be a
21 major media splash and the company knows for a fact that
22 that splash is going to have the adverse effect on the
23 stock. There is not even a claim here --

24 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Has that -- the
25 solicitor general's argument. He wasn't actually even

1 talking about causation. He was talking about a
2 statement you made about the company poised to double
3 its growth. And I think he was saying that on the basis
4 of what you had heard up until that time, you had to
5 have known that that statement was misleading, as was
6 the statement that this drug, that there was absolutely
7 no proof or connection of causation, which was your
8 scientific panel said you couldn't make that extreme
9 statement.

10 MR. HACKER: Well, two points, Your Honor.
11 First, if the claim was about, you know, the consumer
12 sales, you would need an allegation in the case that
13 consumer product sales were actually affected. There's
14 no allegation like that, and the truth is they weren't.
15 And so you're not talking about falsifying any prior
16 claim. There's not even an allegation that that
17 happened, Your Honor.

18 Second, with respect to the -- the
19 statement, as I was discussing with Justice Ginsburg in
20 the beginning part of the argument, the statement was
21 what the scientific panel was addressing primarily was
22 Jafek's claim that Zicam causes anosmia, and the company
23 said accurately that that is completely unfounded and
24 misleading because there is no scientific support for
25 it. You can't go out and claim that Zicam causes

1 anosmia unless you have a scientific basis for that and
2 the scientific panel was saying that isn't true.

3 So the question is whether you can draw an
4 inference of scienter from the fact that -- from what's
5 alleged here, and there is simply no basis for an
6 allegation, supportable allegation that the company knew
7 it causes anosmia and nevertheless refused to tell
8 investors that. Thank you.

9 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.
10 The case is submitted.

11 (Whereupon, at 10:59 a.m., the case in the
12 above-entitled matter was submitted.)

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