The subject which Professor Fesler asked me to tackle here today is a fascinating one when you take time out to stand back and try to analyze it in objective, impersonal terms. It can be an infuriating one on those other three hundred and sixty-four days of the year when, with controversy swirling around you and your objectivity blunted by competing pressures, you try to to make the machinery of bureaucracy responsive to policy decisions.

I assume and sincerely hope that you will concede to me at the outset that the problem and the method of Secretarial direction over Bureau programs and operations will differ among agencies. No two will be alike because, over the years, each has developed its own
institutional personality. No two agencies in town have had the same history, so each has its own traditions. Some agencies have never had a Secretary who left a lasting imprint. Others, like mine, are acutely aware that Carl Schurz and Harold Ickes or Ballinger and Fall are an indelible part of their past.

Similarly, some Departments have a history of cohesiveness and internal discipline. The military establishments, for example, are as old as the republic. They have a single dominant mission. But compare the management requirements of that situation with those faced by the head of an agency only recently set up to consolidate a mixed bag of New Deal, World War II and post-war programs. Then the differences become readily apparent.

Just as agency personalities differ, so also do the
men whom Presidents select to head them. Even among first-rate Department heads, measured by their success in getting the Administration's job done, their methods will vary widely. My first experience at a managerial level in the Federal establishment was with the War Department under Henry L. Stimson. Already an elder statesman of demonstrated competence, the very image of Mr. Stimson--stern, precise, methodical--was enough to convey the message that he was in control and that no foolishness was to be tolerated. We have many very able Department heads in our government today. But there isn't a single one of them who could assume immediate and effective control of his agency by the mere act of taking the oath, as Mr. Stimson did in 1941.

It would do little good for any of us to have me attempt here to catalog the textbook principles or techniques of administrative control. In the first place,
I don't place a whole lot of faith in them as the keys to the temple of success. It is obvious that planning, organization, staffing and all the other managerial functions ending up with budgeting are necessary elements of the process. But in my judgment, and certainly in my recent experience, they are not the vital, dynamic tools that enable the head of a large agency to make bureau programs serve his policy objectives.

Moreover, if I were to tell you that we have these techniques of management control honed down to the sharp edge of perfection in the Department of the Interior, you wouldn't believe me, and I wouldn't blame you. That would be stretching the truth more than somewhat because, as I shall presently develop, we have not had a tradition of centralized departmental management. I think it is a prerequisite that the agency head achieve program dominance before he can wield effective mana-
gerial control. I am also confident that we are approaching both goals at an accelerating pace.

Rather than indulge in such a textbook review, therefore, I think it might be more useful and stimulating to your discussion if I were to use as a case study the method and approach used by one agency head to bring bureau efforts into line with his own policy direction. I refer, of course, to the Department of the Interior in the first five years of Stewart Udall's administration. When I have finished you may conclude that this case study proves nothing because the job, the time, the man and the institution are all unique. If so, I can only refer you back to my premise that all such situations are unique, or nearly so; if an agency is so stable that it can be efficiently managed without vigor and imagination, we had better take another look to see if its function is necessary!
My case study can actually be reported quite briefly. But to get its full flavor, you have to understand the personalities of the institution and the man. And this kind of background statement is not so easily summarized.

Interior has existed as an executive department with cabinet status since 1849. Some of its constituent functions and bureaus even predate that event, some as independent agencies and some as parts of other departments. Moreover, the Department's principal mission emphasis has changed radically over the past century. Once the overseer of veterans' pensions, Federal education responsibilities and similarly minor functions of that period, the tendency over the years has been to displace those non-resource responsibilities as the nation became more concerned with conservation of its natural heritage.
As those functions were created, however, the Congress tended also to create new bureaus with well-defined powers headed by statutory officers whose very existence stemmed from Congressional rather than Secretarial authority. Program development and administrative power thus became vested at the Bureau rather than departmental level. For exactly how long this phenomenon of bureau hegemony has created serious concern I cannot state, but it was most certainly brought to the surface during the Brownlow Committee studies of the New Deal era and Secretary Ickes gave frequent and characteristic expression to its impact on his efforts to fix resource policies.

In any event, it was left to the first Hoover Commission report to highlight the issue in stark enough terms to stimulate corrective measures. Rather than attempt a comprehensive codification and amendment of
the myriad of statutes involved, however, Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1950 merely reassigned to the Secretary, in broad and sweeping terms, practically all of the statutory powers formerly vested in the bureau heads. Since that date statutes creating new functions or assigning new powers have generally vested them in the Secretary.

Entirely apart from the legal basis and history of bureau independence, the very nature of the Department's multifarious mission has had a divisive influence. We commonly refer to ourselves as the Nation's Department of Natural Resources, and this is certainly the dominant focus with all due apologies to the Forest Service, Corps of Engineers, Federal Power Commission and others who share the resource responsibility. But taken as a whole, our job also ranges from running a railroad in Alaska to a tropical health program in the
South Pacific, from the probate of Indian estates to the harvesting and marketing of seal skins in the Pribilof Islands, from the preservation of historic sites in downtown Philadelphia to the management of vast oil shale reserves in the remote reaches of the intermountain West.

In this context, it can readily be seen that the Secretary cannot focus on any single and central theme. He cannot set one goal and say this is my program and all elements of the Department will key to it and devote their energies to its success. Indeed, he may find himself in the position of making choices where equally important programs come in direct conflict. For example, the critical need for conservation of Colorado River water requires dams and reservoirs in the lower basin. These may encroach upon or otherwise change the character of the Grand Canyon which he is charged to protect.
Indians and Eskimos in Alaska, pursuing their traditional subsistence livelihood, harvest migratory birds in a manner contrary to international treaty whose enforcement is his responsibility. What is a departmental program in these situations?

But the fact remains that the present Secretary has cut through these vexations, has succeeded in achieving bureau coordination and has probably more than any other cabinet officer since Harold Ickes and Henry Wallace secured public and Congressional approval for a whole new emphasis on the nation's natural heritage. Given the departmental tradition of administrative pluralism, the techniques of program unification are useful to review.

If I were to settle upon any single phrase to describe this technique, I would call it the "manipulation of change." Stewart Udall demanded imaginative new answers to the resource issues of the day. He
wanted and got sharp departures from traditional approaches. As the bureaus absorbed the shock of these insistent demands and reacted to meet them, they also came to the sudden realization that the Secretary was way out in front of them, in fact committing them to courses of action that they could not shirk without appearing to fail in their responsibilities.

The critical conditions required for rapid change were all present in 1961. The national conservation effort had substantially terminated with World War II and had never recovered its former pace in the years which followed. Although a few brave attempts had been made to revitalize conservation thinking -- such as the National Park Service's Mission 66 and the Bureau of Land Management's stated policy of management rather than custodial care for the public lands -- these had been underfinanced from the start and bore the bureau
stamp, rather than a departmental image.

Moreover, the impact of population on the environment was now apparent -- water requirements, air and stream pollution, urban decay, ugliness in a thousand forms and above all, the enormous demand for outdoor recreation space and facilities. On still another front, the decades of the 1940's and 50's had brought a technological revolution, the products of which had been applied to our resource problems hardly at all.

So, a twenty-year backlog of conservation needs, a developing crisis in the quality of human environment, and the availability of a "new science" to better understand the nature of our universe -- all of these combined to create a climate and a demand for change. Stewart Udall had the imagination, the idealism and the endless supply of energy required to capitalize on the situation.

He opened his attack on a wide variety of fronts --
public lands, Indians, parks and recreation, water resources. Then, when he saw progress being made in one particular area, all of his energies and resources were thrown behind that until acceptance was achieved. Then a new target was selected and a similar process followed.

Now where does the raw material for such program innovation originate? In the first place, the Secretary has himself a superior capacity for idea production. Second, he is a past master at picking the brains of all who appear to harbor useful thoughts. Third, he is a sort of magnet for public contributions. We are rarely short of suggestions on how to do the job better. The task of departmental leadership is to marshal and develop such program proposals, at least in enough detail to make the concept viable.

The Secretary did two things on an institutional
level to make his leadership position secure. In addition to his own, relatively small personal staff, he took over a small staff office which had been created for a different purpose, substantially remade it to his own liking and converted it into the focal staff organization for the development of new program departures. A little later, recognizing the developing importance of science and research, he created the new position of Science Adviser to assist him in remaking certain of the bureaus into instruments of positive scientific inquiry, rather than routine administrative agencies performing functions of dubious value.

I do not mean to say that there was no bureau input into this departmental face-lifting. On the contrary, most of the suggestions for adding new areas to the National Park System came from that Service. Indian education needs were quickly pointed out by that bureau--
and so on.

But on such fundamental matters as a land and water conservation fund, vastly expanded salt water conversion efforts, Colorado River water conservation, basic water resources research, wilderness preservation criteria and the whole theme of environmental conservation -- all of these were enunciated as Secretarial program goals. With the course already decided in this fashion, the bureaus were then brought in to provide the supporting detail of data, argument and justification required to carry the project through. It is not at all an exaggeration, I think, to say that the bureaus have been kept so busy meeting the demands for support of the Secretarial effort that they have had little time to fortify the boundaries of bureau prerogative. The dominant technique, then, has been to get out in front with an innovative concept, then pull the Department
along behind in a support role. Since this involves more than one bureau more often than not, the process of coordination becomes mandatory to success. Having been committed in advance, anything less than total effort becomes a highly visible indication of failure. I have seen no bureau willing to court that result.

I shall not dwell further on the many details that go into this method of achieving policy ascendancy. Quite obviously, special task groups have had to supplement Secretarial staff from time to time. Absolutely essential is direct control over the legislative coordination function. Ultimately, Secretarial policy decisions have to be translated into budgetary decisions.

The main point I would make is that the approach is successful by the most definitive test I know: it works. I would be the first to concede that at a different period in history and a different cast of characters it
might not succeed. The public was ready for change and reacted to the Secretary's leadership. The Secretary is totally dedicated to the ideals he has advanced, is possessed of tremendous powers of persuasion and epitomizes personal courage in the arena of controversy. In fact, controversy tends to give the exact impetus required to carry the day on a resource issue and it has been welcomed more frequently than not.

In essence, therefore, Secretarial leadership and bureau response were achieved by concentration on personal direction of substantive policy development. This bold gambit could not have succeeded, however, without the full support of national political leadership, both executive and legislative. Rarely have any two Presidents been so closely identified with conservation policies as have Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. Not since Eleanor Roosevelt has a First Lady taken to the
hustings for national programs as Mrs. Johnson has for this one. In the past four years we have had two White House conferences on the subject, the first since the Theodore Roosevelt administration. The Interior committees of the Congress have transacted more legislative business than any of their counterparts. These are the devices that keep the Department's program in the public eye and maintain the momentum for change. With all the diversions that compete for Presidential and Congressional attention in this complex era, the emphasis given resource issues is itself a tribute to Udall enthusiasm.

It is a fair question to ask how this methodology of demanding leadership has been received by bureau executives. Perhaps one indicator is the fact that, of the 14 major bureau or office chiefs who came in with Stewart Udall or were held over in office, only three
remain. This is not an entirely valid test, however, since other considerations entered into some of the decisions.

One aspect of these personnel changes is of direct pertinence here. Much has been said and written, especially in the last decade, about the need to have sympathetic policy-making subordinates in Federal agencies. Some have concluded that this really means that non-career, or political appointees must be relied upon to assure policy loyalty. Interior experience over the past five years denies this conclusion. In that period, eleven policy executives have been replaced at bureau or office level. Of these, four career men were succeeded by career men. An equal number of non-careerists had non-career successors. In three instances, a shift was made from one category to another and in every case the successor came from the career
ranks. If this proves anything, it indicates to me that the Secretary and the President can find in the career service not only the technical competence but the policy commitment they need to assure loyal adherence to their program goals. I do not for a moment, however, want to minimize the significance of bureau chief loyalty as a factor in Secretarial control over his department. It is essential at all times and critical in some instances.

In conclusion, let me say that the methods used by Stewart Udall to capitalize on change, expansion and program dynamics were perhaps the only ones that could have successfully transformed the Interior program in half a decade. A more management-oriented Secretary might have used the budget, organization, career management and other instruments to weld a confederation of bureaus into a department. But time is required to
follow that process -- and time would not wait in the quiet crisis situation that confronts us.

Will Interior revert to its former traditions when the present Secretary decides to challenge other dragons? Or if a period of stagnation or retrenchment should usurp the weapon of change?

I am highly optimistic that this need not and will not be the case. The tradition of bureau autonomy has been breached. It is up to us to construct now the institutional mechanisms which will preserve essential departmental unity and policy control. Those mechanisms are at hand, most especially in the program budgeting system now being installed. This highly sophisticated management tool is more than a mere incident of the administrative process. It runs to the very root of program validity in the most substantive way. By making it really meaningful, and not a paper charade to be main-
tained for its own sake, we cannot only preserve the real power of decision but make the bureaus effective partners in policy formulation.