Corporate Compliance and Criminality: Does the Common Law Promote Culpable Blindness?, co-authored with Andrew Brandes, 50 Connecticut Law Review (forthcoming 2018).
Political Insider Trading, 85 Fordham Law Review 2717 (2017).
Bridging Troubled Waters: Linking Corporate Efficiency and Political Legitimacy Through a Discourse Theory of the Firm, 75 Ohio State Law Journal 103 (2014).
A New Discourse Theory of the Firm After Citizens United, 79 George Washington Law Review 102 (2010).
Trust & Transparency: Promoting Efficient Corporate Disclosure Through Fiduciary-Based Discourse, 87 Washington University Law Review 115 (2009).
Building a “New Institutional” Approach to Corporate Speech, 59 Alabama Law Review 247 (2008) (lead article), reprinted in First Amendment Law Handbook 1051(Rodney M. Smolla ed. 2009).
Corporate Speech, Securities Regulation and an Institutional Approach to the First Amendment, 48 Willaim and Mary Law Review (2006), reprinted in First Amendment Law Handbook 601 (Rodney M. Smolla ed. 2008), quoted in Bulldog Investors v. Galvin, 23 Mass. L. Rptr. 413, available at 2007 WL 4647112, at *5 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2007).
Cookies and the Common Law: Are Internet Advertisers Trespassing On Our Computers?, 76 Southern California Law Review 893 (2003).